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HOW NATIONAL PARK LAW REALLY
WORKS
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE *
This Article provides the first explanation of the relationship
between three overlapping sources of national park law. It
first explains how the Organic Act affords the National Park
Service substantial discretion to manage the national parks,
including deciding the proper balance between enjoyment
and conservation in particular instances. It next shows how
federal environmental statutes push national park
management toward preservation rather than enjoyment.
Finally, the Article explains that Congress often intervenes to
mandate particular management outcomes at individual
parks, typically but not always toward enjoyment rather
than preservation. The result is that the National Park
Service has substantial discretion to manage national parks
in a manner that pursues the dual Organic Act purposes of
enjoyment and conservation, but Congress occasionally
exercises its ultimate authority to specify which purpose
should prevail in particular circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION
National parks are celebrated for many things, but not for
law. For their first forty-four years, different agencies managed
the national parks as separate entities. 1 Then Congress
enacted the Organic Act in 1916, which created the National
Park Service (NPS) and instructed the new agency how to
manage the national parks. 2 That statute, with no significant
amendment, has governed the national parks for ninety-eight
years, but the Supreme Court has never interpreted the
Organic Act’s management provisions. 3
The heart of the Organic Act is its statement of purpose
authored by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.—the son of the
developer of New York City’s Central Park—who became
1. See JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 185
(1961).
2. Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
3. The Court was asked to interpret the Organic Act’s management
provisions in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), which involved a
challenge to a proposed ski resort next to Sequoia National Park. See Brief for the
Envtl. Def. Fund as Amicus Curiae, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(No. 70-34), 1971 WL 133798 at *69, *72 (denying “that the Secretary [of the
Interior’s] judgment is supreme on questions of national park administration,” but
recognizing that the NPS’s “authority to construct roads on park lands . . . have
never been the object of judicial scrutiny”). Instead, the Court held that the
environmental groups lacked standing to bring their claim. Perhaps the closest
that the Court came to interpreting the Organic Act was in Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984), which upheld the NPS’s
prohibition on camping in Lafayette Park next to the White House. But Clark was
a First Amendment case involving the expressive quality of “camping” by
protestors; it did not require the Court to interpret the management provisions of
the Organic Act. Id.
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famous himself as a lifelong advocate of national parks.
Olmsted wrote that the purpose of the NPS is to
[P]romote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known
as national parks, monuments, and reservations hereinafter
specified by such means and measures as conform to the
fundamental purposes of the said parks, monuments, and
reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations. 4

The Organic Act’s “fundamental purpose” is to pursue the
dual goals of conservation and enjoyment of all national parks.
These twin commands of the Organic Act often support the
same management actions. Often, one can enjoy a national
park while conserving it at the same time. Hiking, nature
photography, and wildlife observation are among the many
activities that are consistent with both enjoying a park and
conserving it. Conversely, other activities threaten both the
enjoyment and the conservation of a national park. Dams have
played a particularly prominent role in national park
disputes. 5 Mining, logging, climate change, and constructing
residential subdivisions are additional examples of actions that
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1. See National Park Service: Hearing Before the H. Public
Lands Comm., 64th Cong. 52 (1916) [hereinafter 1916 NPS hearing] (testimony of
J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic Associations) (stating that
it was Olmsted “who framed the sentence” in the Organic Act that described the
purpose of the national parks). Besides his work on Central Park, Olmsted’s
father reported on the scenic value of Yosemite soon after Congress reserved it
from development, see FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, THE YOSEMITE VALLEY AND THE
MARIPOSA BIG TREE GROVE (1865), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK
SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 12 (Lary M. Dilsaver ed., 1994), and it is the
senior Olmsted whose home is now a national historic site under the National
Park Service, see Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-87, § 201, 93 Stat. 664 (1979)
(establishing the Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site); TOM A. COBURN,
M.D., PARKED! HOW CONGRESS’ MISPLACED PRIORITIES ARE TRASHING OUR
NATIONAL TREASURES 148 (2013) (reporting that “[a]t a cost of $221.30 per visitor,
Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site is one of the 10 most expensive
National Parks per visitor in the continental United States”).
5. See generally ISE, supra note 1, passim (describing dam controversies
involving national parks); ROBERT W. RIGHTER, THE BATTLE OVER HETCH
HETCHY: AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DAM AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2005); MARK W.T. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF WILDERNESS:
ECHO PARK AND THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (2000).
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interfere with both the enjoyment of a park and its
conservation. Those are easy cases under the Organic Act.
But there are many times when the goals of enjoyment and
conservation conflict. Snowmobiles provide a memorable
opportunity to enjoy winter in Yellowstone National Park, but
they can threaten the conservation of wildlife, air quality, and
natural soundscapes. Scenic flights provide an unparalleled
view of the Grand Canyon, but they interfere with the national
park’s natural quiet and with the visual experience of people
enjoying the scene from the ground. Cell phone towers enable
visitors to communicate with friends or with park rangers in
the event of an emergency, but they can obstruct the natural
scenic view and interfere with the wilderness experience.
Roads provide the primary means of access for nearly all
visitors to nearly all national parks, but the same roads can be
devastating to a park’s environmental qualities. 6 There are
many other ways to enjoy national parks that are in tension
with the conservation of the parks. 7
The Organic Act does not resolve such conflicts. To be sure,
scholars and advocates have gleaned opposing preferences for
enjoyment or for conservation from the Organic Act’s language
and from the purpose of the national parks. The most recent
version of the NPS management policies, for example, states a
6. See, e.g., ROBERT SHANKLAND, STEVE MATHER OF THE NATIONAL PARKS
151 (1951) (noting that the first cars arrived in Mount Rainier in 1911, Glacier in
1912, Sequoia and Yosemite in 1913, Mesa Verde in 1914, and Yellowstone in
1915, but the roads “frightened” all but the most intrepid drivers).
7. See National Park Service’s Draft Management Policies: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on National Parks of the S. Energy and Natural Res. Comm., 109th
Cong. 13 (2005) (statement of Denis Galvin, former NPS Deputy Director, on
behalf of National Parks Conservation Association) (offering additional examples
of off-road vehicles at Cape Hatteras National Seashore, artificial watering holes
in Mojave National Preserve, cruise ships at Glacier Bay National Park, and the
location of a new lodge in Sequoia National Park). For some of the surprising
possible ways of enjoying national parks, see, for example, National Parks of
California: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (testimony of
Michael Tollefson, Superintendent, Yosemite National Park) (noting that
Yosemite has one of the last remaining ski areas in the national park system);
National Parks in the Pacific Northwest: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Res. of the H. Gov’t Reform Comm.,
109th Cong. 7 (2005) (testimony of Rep. Jay Inslee) (remarking that “[j]et skis . . .
don’t belong in Crater Lake National Park, although, it would be intriguing to see
them go around the little island there”); RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA’S
NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 28 (1984) (noting that an NPS assistant
director once favored the running of a cable car across the Grand Canyon, but
NPS Director Stephen Mather opposed it).
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preference for conservation. 8 But no court has overturned a
NPS decision to favor enjoyment instead of conservation—or
vice versa—because it conflicted with the Organic Act. 9
That would seem to leave enjoyment and conservation on
an equal playing field subject to the discretion of the NPS. But
laws that protect certain features of the environment push
national park management toward preservation. The very
characteristics of a national park—rare wildlife, wilderness
areas, clean air and water, abundant wetlands, historic
structures, free-flowing rivers—subject park management to
the additional requirements of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), 10 the Wilderness Act, 11 the Clean Air Act (CAA), 12 the
Clean Water Act (CWA), 13 the National Historic Preservation
Act (NHPA), 14 and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA),15
among many other federal environmental statutes. The NPS,
therefore, must manage national parks consistent with these
other conservation commands. And the courts have overturned
NPS management decisions that would have authorized
opportunities to enjoy national parks because those decisions
violated these other federal environmental statutes. 16
The tilt toward conservation accomplished by these
environmental statutes sometimes faces a statutory push back
in the direction of enjoyment. Congress mandates specific
management policies for individual parks in two different
ways. First, many acts establishing a new national park
contain provisions directing the NPS to permit or prohibit
certain activities. Second, Congress legislates in response to
8. NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006 11 (2006) [hereinafter
2006 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES] (stating that “when there is a conflict between
conserving resources and values and providing for enjoyment of them,
conservation is to be predominant”).
9. The one district court decision relying on the Organic Act to invalidate a
NPS management decision to allow the enjoyment of a national park at the risk of
interfering with the conservation of the park was reversed on appeal, as I discuss
infra notes 73–87. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205
(D. Utah 1998), rev’d, 222 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2000), It is rare for a court to hold
that a NPS management decision violates the Organic Act even in the context of
actions that could harm both conservation and enjoyment of a national park.
10. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
11. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2012).
12. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012).
13. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1274 (2012).
14. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470–470x-6 (2012).
15. Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2012).
16. See infra Part II.
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particular NPS actions to require a contrary management
policy in a specific national park. Such specific statutory
commands typically favor greater opportunities to enjoy a
national park, although Congress occasionally calls for greater
conservation than the NPS planned to provide. Similarly,
informal congressional oversight of the NPS often encourages
certain activities to be allowed in a national park, and the NPS
often heeds those suggestions even though they are not legally
binding.
The combination of the Organic Act, other federal
environmental statutes, and statutes that govern a specific
park is normatively desirable from the perspective of ideal park
management. This combination presumes that the NPS has the
expertise to resolve the competing demands of enjoyment and
conservation in most instances. It recognizes that certain
environmental values are entitled to the special protection
afforded them by federal environmental statutes. And it
acknowledges that Congress may intervene to mandate a
particular outcome based on its balancing of the competing
values.
This Article provides the first explanation of the
relationship between these three overlapping sources of
national park law. Part I explains first how the Organic Act
affords the NPS substantial discretion to manage the national
parks, including deciding the proper balance between
enjoyment and conservation in particular instances. Part II
shows how federal environmental statutes push national park
management toward preservation rather than enjoyment. Part
III shows how Congress often intervenes to mandate particular
management outcomes at individual parks, typically but not
always toward enjoyment rather than preservation. The result
is that the NPS has substantial discretion to manage national
parks in a manner that pursues the dual Organic Act purposes
of enjoyment and conservation, but Congress occasionally
exercises its ultimate authority to specify which purpose should
prevail in particular circumstances. The recognition of this
tripartite legal structure shows why no single source of legal
authority explains how national parks are managed, and it
clarifies the complementary roles that the NPS, Congress, and
the courts play in resolving specific park management
disputes.
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THE ORGANIC ACT

The Organic Act has governed the management of the
national parks since 1916, and it remains the principle source
of legal authority for the NPS. This Part describes how the
Organic Act’s broad statutory terms afford the NPS broad
discretion in making management decisions. I first explain how
the Organic Act evolved from the statutes that Congress
enacted to establish new national parks prior to 1916, and I
then analyze the meaning of the Act pursuant to current
understandings of statutory interpretation.
A. The Evolution of the Organic Act
In 1872, Congress enacted a statute designating the area
near the headwaters of the Yellowstone River “as a public park
or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the
people.” 17 That act established Yellowstone as the first national
park. 18 Similar “benefit and enjoyment of the people” language
appeared in many of the statutes that Congress enacted to
create fourteen more national parks in the next forty-four
years. 19 Those park establishment acts contained an additional
17. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (1872) [hereinafter Yellowstone
National Park establishment act].
18. The two competing claimants are Hot Springs National Park, which dates
from an 1832 congressional reservation, and Yosemite National Park, which
resulted from an 1864 statute deeding the area to the state of California. See ISE,
supra note 1, at 13 (describing but rejecting the claims of Hot Springs and
Yosemite to be the first national park).
19. See Act of Aug. 9, 1916, ch. 302, § 1, 39 Stat. 442 (1916) [hereinafter
Lassen Volcanic National Park establishment act]; Act of Aug. 1, 1916, ch. 264, §
1, 39 Stat. 432 (1916) [hereinafter Hawaii National Park establishment act]; Act
of Jan. 26, 1915, ch. 19, § 1, 38 Stat. 798 (1915) [hereinafter Rocky Mountain
National Park establishment act]; Act of May 11, 1910, ch. 226, § 1, 36 Stat. 354
(1910) [hereinafter Glacier National Park establishment act]; Act of May 22, 1902,
ch. 820, § 1, 32 Stat. 202 (1902) [hereinafter Crater Lake National Park
establishment act]; Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 377, § 1, 30 Stat. 993 (1899)
[hereinafter Mount Rainier National Park establishment act]; Act of Sept. 25,
1890, ch. 926, § 1, 26 Stat. 478 (1890) [hereinafter Sequoia National Park
establishment act] (later renamed King’s Canyon). The other national parks that
Congress created before it enacted the Organic Act in 1916 include Yosemite
(1890), Wind Cave (1903), and Mesa Verde (1906). See ISE, supra note 1, at 13–222
(describing the establishment of the national parks that preceded the Organic
Act). Three other early national parks are no longer national parks. See JOHN
COPELAND NAGLE, LAW’S ENVIRONMENT: HOW THE LAW SHAPES THE PLACES WE
LIVE 102–03 (2010) (describing the rise and fall of Sully’s Hill National Park in
eastern North Dakota); DENNIS MUNCRIEF, A HISTORY OF PLATT NATIONAL PARK
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number of common provisions. Many of them directed the
Secretary of the Interior to provide for “the accommodation of
visitors” within the park. 20 They even authorized the
construction of private “summer homes.” 21 They also instructed
the Secretary to preserve a national park’s “natural curiosities
and wonders . . . in their natural condition,” sometimes
qualified by “as far as practicable.” 22
The statutes establishing national parks contained many
of the same provisions, but as the number of parks “grew like
Topsy” with “no one . . . particularly concerned about them,”
the need for their centralized administration became evident. 23
John Lacey, the Iowan who was perhaps the first congressman
to emphasize environmental conservation, proposed legislation
(2007) (recounting the history of an area in Oklahoma that was a national park
from 1906 to 1976); ISE, supra note 1, at 49 (noting the brief history of Mackinac
Island National Park from 1875 to 1895); see also id. at 136 (referring to Wind
Cave, Sully’s Hill, and Platt as “three inferior national parks”).
20. See Lassen Volcanic National Park establishment act § 2; Hawaii
National Park establishment act § 4; Glacier National Park establishment act § 2;
Mount Rainier National Park establishment act § 2; Act of Jan. 9, 1903, ch. 63, §
3, 32 Stat. 765 (establishing Wind Cave National Park); Crater Lake National
Park establishment act § 3; Sequoia National Park establishment act § 2.
21. Lassen Volcanic National Park establishment act § 2; Glacier National
Park establishment act § 2.
22. See Lassen Volcanic National Park establishment act § 2; Hawaii
National Park establishment act § 4; Rocky Mountain National Park
establishment act § 4 (authorizing regulations “primarily aimed at the freest of
the said recreation purposes by the public and for the preservation of the natural
conditions and scenic beauties thereof”); Glacier National Park establishment act
§ 2 (directing the Secretary to provide “for the preservation of [Glacier National
Park] in a state of nature so far as is consistent with the purposes of this act”); Act
of June 29, 1906, ch. 3607, 34 Stat. 616 (1906) (directing the Secretary to enact
regulations “for the preservation from injury or spoliation of the ruins and other
works and relics of prehistoric or primitive man within” Mesa Verde National
Park); Crater Lake National Park establishment act § 2 (directing the Secretary
to establish rules and regulations, and “cause adequate measures to be taken for
the preservation of the natural objects within said park, and also for the
protection of the timber from wanton depredation, the preservation of all kinds of
game and fish, the punishment of trespassers, the removal of unlawful occupants
and intruders, and the prevention and extinguishment of all forest fires” at Crater
Lake National Park); Mount Rainier National Park establishment act § 2
(directing the management of Mount Rainier National Park to “provide for the
preservation from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural
curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural
condition”); Sequoia National Park establishment act § 2 (same); Yellowstone
National Park establishment act § 1 (same).
23. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE HELD AT THE
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK, SEPTEMBER 11 & 12, 1911 3 (1912) [hereinafter
1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE] (statement of Secretary of the Interior
Walter L. Fisher).
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“to establish and administer [a] national parks office” in
1902. 24 Theodore Roosevelt championed national parks and
conservation generally, but the idea of an office to manage the
parks remained dormant during his seven years in office. 25
Then it was embraced by two figures who now have
considerably less standing in environmental history: President
William Howard Taft and his Secretary of the Interior Richard
Ballinger. 26 Ballinger’s December 1, 1910, annual report
proposed the creation of a “bureau of national parks and
resorts.” 27 Five days later, President Taft observed in his
annual address to Congress that “[o]ur national parks have
become so extensive and involve so much detail of action in
their control that it seems to me there ought to be legislation
creating a bureau for their care and control.” 28 Taft expanded
on that plea in a 1911 speech to the American Civic Association
and in his 1912 address to Congress, where he “earnestly
recommend[ed] the establishment of a bureau of national
parks.” 29 The Department of the Interior convened national
24. H.R. 11021, 56th Cong. (1st Sess. 1900). Lacey later authored the Lacey
Act that prohibits the illegal trade in wildlife, the Antiquities Act, and other
important environmental legislation. See ISE, supra note 1, at 147–53 (describing
Lacey as “one of the towering figures in the conservation movement who pushed
the legislation that protected Yellowstone’s wildlife, saved forest reserves from
congressional repeal, and championed the Antiquities Act”).
25. Roosevelt’s otherwise memorable conservation achievements included
only two new national parks. See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS
WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 450–73 (2009)
(describing the creation of Crater Lake and Wind Cave National Parks).
26. Ballinger is remembered today not for his advocacy of national parks, but
rather for inciting President Taft to dismiss legendary Forest Service Chief
Gifford Pinchot. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR
UNTOLD CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY (2013) (briefly describing the dispute between
Ballinger, Pinchot, and Taft); JAMES PENICK, JR., PROGRESSIVE POLITICS AND
CONSERVATION: THE BALLINGER-PINCHOT AFFAIR ix–xiv (1968) (explaining the
conflicting historical perspectives on who was at fault for the controversy).
27. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1910 60 (1911) [hereinafter 1910 BALLINGER REPORT]. See
RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 30 (1997)
(crediting J. Horace McFarland, the head of the American Civic Association, with
suggesting the idea of better national park supervision to Ballinger in light of the
ongoing fight about damming Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park).
28. President William Howard Taft, Second Annual Message, The White
House, Dec. 6, 1910, in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 5, 55
(David H. Burton ed., 2002).
29. William Howard Taft, President, Message Concerning the Work of the
Interior Department and Other Matters, Feb. 2, 1912, in 16 COMP. MESSAGES &
PAPERS PRES. 7719, 7724 (1913) [hereinafter Taft Message]. See William Howard
Taft, President, Address on a National Parks Bureau (Dec. 13, 1911), in THE
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parks conferences in 1911, 1912, and 1915 to discuss the state
of the national parks and their management. 30
Stephen Mather became the pivotal figure in the
establishment of the NPS and its early administration. He left
his successful California mining business to work in the
Department of the Interior and lead a “crusade for the parks”
unlike anything Washington had seen before. 31 “All over the
country, newspapers and magazines ran glowing feature
stories about the parks—the result of Mather’s constant
cultivation of publishers and writers.” 32 The National
Geographic Society dedicated an entire issue of its magazine to
national parks in April 1916, which was “[p]robably the single
most important publication to influence members of
Congress.” 33 Congress held hearings on proposed bills to
AMERICAN CIVIC ASSOCIATION’S MOVEMENT FOR A BUREAU OF NATIONAL PARKS
3–5 (1912). The American Civic Association began to push for a national parks
bureau at the beginning of 1910. See ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 87 (4th ed. 2010) (describing “the idea for a bureau of
national parks” as “[e]ntirely traceable to the American Civic Association”). The
group’s president, J. Horace McFarland, was a leader of the City Beautiful
movement, “the nation’s best-known horticulturalist,” the leader of a successful
campaign to block hydroelectric development of Niagara Falls and the
unsuccessful campaign to block the Hetch Hetchy dam, and a leader of the
campaign for the NPS. See DAYTON DUNCAN & KEN BURNS, THE NATIONAL
PARKS: AMERICA’S BEST IDEA 162 (2011) (describing McFarland); HANS HUTH,
NATURE AND THE AMERICAN: THREE CENTURIES OF CHANGING ATTITUDES 184
(1990) (same).
30. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE HELD AT
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, MAR. 11, 12 & 13 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 NATIONAL
PARK CONFERENCE]; PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE HELD
AT THE YOSEMITE NATIONAL PARK, OCT. 14, 15 & 16, 1912 (1913) [hereinafter
1912 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE]; 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra
note 23. A final conference was held in 1917, the year after the Organic Act
became law. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE HELD IN THE
AUDITORIUM OF THE NEW NATIONAL MUSEUM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JAN. 2, 3, 4, 5
& 6, 1917 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE]. See generally
SELLARS, supra note 27, at 32 (advising that “[e]specially because the Organic
Act’s legislative history includes few official congressional hearings and reports,
the conference proceedings provide important evidence of the intentions behind
the act”).
31. DUNCAN & BURNS, supra note 29, at 161.
32. Id. See also HORACE M. ALBRIGHT & MARIAN ALBRIGHT SCHENCK,
CREATING THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE MISSING YEARS 142 (1999)
(recalling that “the friends and adherents of Stephen Mather and national parks
let loose a torrent of publicity for the parks and for the bill”).
33. ALBRIGHT & SCHENCK, supra note 32, at 143. See Gilbert H. Grosvenor,
The Land of the Best: Tribute to the Scenic Grandeur and Unsurpassed Natural
Resources of Our Own Country, 29 NAT. GEO. 327 (1916); see also DUNCAN &
BURNS, supra note 29, at 162 (noting that “Mather made sure that a copy” of the
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establish a national parks agency in 1912, 1915, and 1916. 34
Congress finally approved the legislation in August 1916, and
President Wilson signed the Organic Act without fanfare. 35
The Organic Act remains the governing statute for the
NPS. The General Authorities Act, enacted in 1970, affirmed
that all of the units under the jurisdiction of the NPS “though
distinct in character, are united through their inter-related
purposes and resources into one national park system as
cumulative expressions of a single national heritage.” 36 The
Redwoods Act of 1978 added that “[t]he promotion and
regulation of the various areas of the National Park System . . .
shall be consistent with and founded in the purpose established
by [the Organic Act], to the common benefit of all the people of
the United States.” 37 The act further explained that
The authorization of activities shall be construed and the
protection, management, and administration of these areas
shall be conducted in light of the high public value and
integrity of the National Park System and shall not be
exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which
these various areas have been established, except as may
have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by
Congress. 38

The upshot of the General Authorities Act and the
Redwoods Act is that all national park units should receive the
same legal treatment under the Organic Act, rather than
National Geographic article “was placed on every congressman’s desk”).
34. See 1916 NPS hearing, supra note 4; National Park Service: Hearing
Before the H. Public Lands Comm., 63d Cong. (1914) [hereinafter 1914 NPS
hearing]; Establishment of a National Park Service: Hearing Before the H. Public
Lands Comm., 62d Cong. (1912) [hereinafter 1912 NPS hearing].
35. Horace Albright, who was serving as an assistant in the Department of
the Interior and who later became the NPS’s second director, tells the story of the
enactment of the Organic Act in ALBRIGHT & SCHENCK, supra note 32, at 142–48.
According to Albright, President Wilson “was totally uninterested in conservation,
national parks, or anything that pertained to the great outdoors.” Id. at 301.
Wilson signed the Organic Act only when Albright included the enrolled bill in a
package containing an army appropriations bill that Wilson was eager to sign. See
id. at 146.
36. National Park System General Authorities Act, Pub. L. No. 91-383, § 1, 84
Stat. 825 (1970) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1994)).
37. Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 166 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1994)).
38. Id.
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providing different rules for national parks, national seashores,
national historic sites, and the many other categories of land
managed by the NPS. 39 Other laws govern the private
concessions that provide visitor services within the parks. 40
But none of the subsequent statutes affect the NPS’s
fundamental obligation “to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.” 41
There are many easy cases under the Organic Act. If a
management action promotes both conservation and
enjoyment, then the law allows it. Efforts to preserve native
wildlife that appeals to tourists satisfy both sides of the
Organic Act’s equation. Similarly, the law prohibits a
management decision that would compromise the conservation
of a park while interfering with the ability to enjoy the park.
That is why, for example, mineral production and other
extractive activities do not take place within national parks. 42
The challenge presented by the Organic Act is that promoting
the enjoyment of the national parks may compromise the
conservation of the parks, while promoting conservation may
interfere with enjoyment. 43 The drafters of the Organic Act
39. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.D.C.
1986) (finding that the two laws demonstrate that “Congress conceived of the park
system as an integrated whole,” thereby refuting the NPS’s earlier reliance on
separate management categories for each type of unit); see also Bicycle Trails
Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1451–52 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining the
demise of the NPS management categories). There are now 59 national parks and
346 other units in the national park system. See National Park System, NAT’L
PARK SERV. (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nps.gov/news/upload/CLASSLST405updated01-15-2015.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QE5G-CRDD (listing nineteen
types of designations, such as national battlefields and national seashores, along
with a catchall category of “other designations”).
40. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman,
Concessions Law and Policy in the National Park System, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 729
(1997) (providing an overview of concessions within the national parks).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
42. See Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding
that the NPS failed to adequately explain its approval of oil and gas drilling near
the Big Thicket National Preserve).
43. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. EVERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 80 (1972)
(asserting that “[s]ince the day the Act was passed, two all-pervasive elements,
‘preservation’ and ‘use,’ have been involved in every decision, large or small, that
has ever affected the parks”); Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory
Detail in National Park Establishment Legislation and Its Relationship To
Pollution Control Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 779, 780 (1997) (observing that “the
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were aware of that tension. Horace Albright, who was deeply
involved in the enactment of the Organic Act and then served
as the second director of the NPS, wrote years later that the
proponents of the law were aware of the “inherent conflicts
between use and preservation.” 44
These conflicts persist even though we have had nearly one
hundred years to determine what the Organic Act means. The
Supreme Court has never interpreted the Organic Act’s
purpose statement. The Court has, however, explained how to
interpret statutes. Statutory interpretation begins with the
statute’s text, 45 but the Organic Act does not define its key
terms of “conserve,” “enjoyment,” and “impairment.” 46
Contemporary dictionaries fail to shed any light on the
meaning of those terms, 47 nor does the legislative history of the
Organic Act provide evidence that Congress sought to resolve
the potential conflict between conserving and enjoying national
parks. 48 Yale historian Robin Winks conducted the most
painstaking investigation of the history of the law, even
searching the personal papers of the members of the relevant
congressional committees. 49 Winks described the law as “the
Organic Act sets up an elegant tension between providing for enjoyment (often
interpreted as recreation) and leaving units unimpaired (often interpreted as
preservation)”).
44. HORACE M. ALBRIGHT & ROBERT CAHN, THE BIRTH OF THE NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE: THE FOUNDING YEARS, 1913–3, at 35 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170
(2012) (noting that “traditional tools of interpretation . . . begin with the text of
the” statute).
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1.
47. Cf. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (relying on
“dictionaries from the era” that a statute was enacted). The Century Dictionary &
Cyclopedia was the preferred reference for Congress at the time that it debated
the Organic Act. See Robin W. Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916: “A
Contradictory Mandate”?, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 589, 589–90 (1997). According to
that dictionary, “conservation” means “[t]he act of conserving, guarding, or
keeping with care; preservation from loss, decay, injury, or violation; the keeping
of a thing in a safe or entire state,” 2 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA
1207 (1903); “enjoyment” means “[t]he possession, use, or occupancy of a thing
with satisfaction or pleasure,” 3 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA 1936
(1903), and “impair” means “[d]iminution; decrease; loss, injury, disgrace.” 6 THE
CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA 3001 (1903).
48. The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation is controversial,
but the Court routinely consults it, especially when the text of a statute is
unclear. See, e.g., Hall v. United States 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1892 (2012) (cautioning
“against ‘allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory
language’”) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011)).
49. See Winks, supra note 47, passim.
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result of some six years of discussion, intense lobbying by a
variety of interest groups, and growing public concern.” 50 Yet it
is surprising how few members of Congress were actively
involved in the development of the Organic Act because they
were busy with other legislative business. 51
With only modest help from the statute’s text and
legislative history, the statute’s purpose becomes especially
important in ascertaining its meaning. That purpose emerges
from the available records, which support a broad conception of
the congressional understanding of the goals of national park
management. Congress was most concerned about the
enjoyment of the national parks, which required efforts to
encourage people to visit them, and increased visitation in turn
necessitated efforts to make the parks more accessible. These
three steps—accessibility  visitation  enjoyment—
animated much of the congressional and popular debate that
resulted in the Organic Act.
Professor Winks, for example, identified the preservation
of scenery and “making the scenery accessible for the
‘enjoyment’ of the public” as prominent themes during the
debate over the proposed law. 52 Numerous members of
Congress and other officials extolled the scenic value of
national parks. 53 The historians who have studied the
enactment of the Organic Act agree that there was much more
attention paid to enjoying that scenery than conserving it.54
50. Id. at 583.
51. For example, Representative Carl Hayden of the new state of Arizona
“was fully engaged in speaking out on women’s suffrage, the European war, and
prohibition; if he ever spoke in public on the Organic Act, there is no record of it in
his papers.” Id. at 584 n.9.
52. Id. at 583.
53. See, e.g., 1912 NPS hearing, supra note 34, at 5 (letter from Secretary of
the Agriculture James Wilson) (observing that “there are many areas containing
natural wonders or features of great scenic interest which should be included
within national parks”); id. at 13 (testimony of Secretary of the Interior Walter
Fisher) (insisting that national parks ought to be managed “to help the scenic
beauty of the parks”); id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Raker) (asserting that “you do
not find any [area] on earth that contains the scenic beauty and grandeur and
necessity for preservation as in those national parks”).
54. See Robert B. Keiter, Revisiting the Organic Act: Can It Meet the Next
Century’s Conservation Challenges?, 28 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 240, 241 (2011)
(concluding that “[t]o the extent that anyone at the various hearings spoke about
the parks themselves, they did so primarily in terms of their recreational, scenic,
and educational value”); SELLARS, supra note 27, at 28–29 (agreeing that
“[p]roponents saw the parks as scenic recreation areas that should be vigorously
developed for public use and enjoyment”); id. at 45 (reporting that “the founders
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Ironically, it was Secretary of the Interior Ballinger who
proclaimed that “[t]he setting apart and dedication of our
national parks for the people is the only practical means of
preserving their wild grandeur from human desecration,” even
as Ballinger was accused of undermining Theodore Roosevelt’s
conservation accomplishments. 55 Even more ironically, and
even as it was crafting the NPS, Congress rejected the pleas of
conservationists to preserve the scenic Hetch Hetchy Valley
within Yosemite National Park, and instead Congress
authorized a dam which continues to flood the valley to this
day. 56
The debate preceding the enactment of the Organic Act
emphasized the need to attract more visitors to the national
parks. One railroad official explained that the purpose of the
1911 national parks conference was “to consider in what
manner the number of visitors to the various parks can be
increased.” 57 The working assumption was that more visitors
would result in more popular support for the national parks.
Just before the predecessor of the Organic Act was proposed in
Congress, the 26,000 people who visited Platt National Park in
Oklahoma in 1908 were the most to see any national park. 58
Another 19,542 people visited Yellowstone, and no other
national park attracted more than 10,000 visitors. 59 Those
numbers jumped as Congress debated the Organic Act. Hot
Springs Reservation in Arkansas was the most visited national
park in 1915 with 115,000 visitors. 60 Yellowstone was next
gave no substantive consideration to an exacting biological preservation”). See
generally John Copeland Nagle, Scenic Law (draft manuscript on file with author)
(reviewing the scenic value of national parks).
55. 1910 BALLINGER REPORT, supra note 27, at 56.
56. See Winks, supra note 47, at 592 (noting that the December 1913
congressional and presidential approval of a dam to flood Hetch Hetchy
“infring[ed] in the most basic and dramatic way . . . and most clearly
contradict[ed] any rhetoric to that point about scenic preservation and recreation
being the highest values”). In 2012, San Francisco voters rejected a ballot
initiative that would have begun the process of restoring Hetch Hetchy. See San
Francisco Hetch Hetchy Reservoir Initiative, Proposition F, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/San_Francisco_Hetch_Hetchy_Reservoir_Initiative,_Proposi
tion_F_(November_2012) (last visited Nov. 22, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/ELW3-E9C7.
57. 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 6 (statement of
Thomas Cooper, Assistant to the President, Northern Pacific Railway).
58. See 1916 NPS hearing, supra note 4, at 40. On the rise and fall of Pratt
National Park, see MUNCRIEF, supra note 19.
59. See 1916 NPS hearing, supra note 4, at 40.
60. See id. There were no statistics for Hot Springs in 1908.
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with 51,895 visitors, followed by Mount Rainier, Yosemite, and
Rocky Mountain with just over 30,000 each. 61 These numbers
were better, but the proponents of the national parks wanted
more.
The framers of the Organic Act saw the lack of access to
the national parks as the greatest impediment to more
visitation. “These parks belonging to the people should be made
so accessible that all who wish to do so may behold their
beauties and wonders,” proclaimed one railroad official.62
President Taft gave a speech in which he advised that “[i]f we
are going to have national parks, we ought to make them
available to the people, and we ought to build the roads, as
expensive as they may be, in order that those parks may
become what they are intended to be when Congress creates
them.” 63 In his original report recommending a national park
agency, Secretary of the Interior Ballinger reported that “the
road and trail problems for public travel and convenience to
enable tourists to obtain the benefits of the scenic beauties are
primary.” 64 Stephen Mather noted the increasing number of
motorists who were visiting national parks. 65 Another
61. See id.
62. 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 9 (statement of
O.W. Lehmer, Superintendent & Traffic Manager, Yosemite Valley Railroad). See
also 1912 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra note 30, at 48 (statement of J.J.
Byrne, Assistant Passenger Traffic Manager, Santa Fe Railway) (asserting that
“one of the great drawbacks that has held the Yosemite from attaining the
prominence in the world of travel to which it is entitled is the difficulty of getting
in and out”); id. at 130 (statement of Col. W.W. Forsyth, Acting Superintendent,
Yosemite National Park) (contending that “when the Government sets aside a
park for that purpose, it takes on itself the obligation of making that park
accessible for all the people”); 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra note 23,
at 13 (statement of A.G. Wells, General Manager Coast Lines, Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway System) (stating that “[t]hese great wonders of nature, wisely
set aside by the Government for the benefit of the people, would be altogether
inaccessible but for transportation”).
63. See 1914 NPS hearing, supra note 34, at 6 (excerpting President Taft’s
speech). See also Taft Message, supra note 29, at 7724 (stating that the national
park agency should make “recommendations as to the best method of improving
their accessibility and usefulness”). At 300 pounds, Taft confronted special
obstacles to enjoying the national parks. See 1914 NPS hearing, supra note 34, at
6 (President Taft recalling that he could not journey down Bright Angel Trail into
the Grand Canyon “because they were afraid the mules could not carry me,”
which convinced Taft that “something needs to be done in respect to those parks if
we are all to enjoy them”).
64. 1910 BALLINGER REPORT, supra note 27, at 57.
65. See 1916 NPS hearing, supra note 4, at 23 (testimony of Stephen Mather)
(remarking that “[t]he motorist magazines have been full of accounts of the parks,
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Department of the Interior official testified that “the largest
part of the money” for Yosemite National Park went “into the
maintenance and construction of roads.” 66 Yellowstone became
one of the last national parks to open to automobiles in 1915, a
development that was “much appreciated by the traveling
public.” 67 By contrast, a railroad official noted that “[n]obody
wants to travel by wagon any more. It takes too long.” 68
Accommodations within the national parks were another
concern. Walter Fisher, Ballinger’s successor as Secretary of
the Interior, testified that “the people who go to the Yosemite
Park will come away with a feeling of disappointment and
resentment against the National Government, because they
have not been properly taken care of” because of the absence of
hotel accommodations. 69 Earlier, Ballinger called for “roads,
trails, telegraph and telephone lines, sewer and water systems,
hotel
accommodations,
transportation,
and
other
conveniences.” 70 The popular supporters of the proposed
Organic Act echoed these calls. The Outlook editorialized that
the proposed NPS “would act as a means of educating the
American people in the use of and enjoyment of their own vast
property.” 71 Another journal applauded that the existing laws
guaranteed the preservation of national parks “from abuse and
reckless exploitation,” but it worried that “the provisions for
their enjoyment by the people are inadequate and

and they have brought the parks nearer the motorists”). See also Winks, supra
note 47, at 583 (observing that “[a]utomobilists wished to see roads to and within
the parks upgraded so that visitors could tour the parks in greater comfort”).
66. 1914 NPS hearing, supra note 34, at 12 (statement of Adolph C. Miller,
Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior).
67. 1916 NPS hearing, supra note 4, at 42. See also ALBRIGHT & SCHENCK,
supra note 32, at 127 (recalling that national park supporters “recognized that the
introduction of automobiles would vastly increase visitation to the parks and their
use. However, we also knew the Congress would count tourist visitation to decide
how much money our bureau would get to operate the park system”).
68. 1916 NPS hearing, supra note 4, at 68 (testimony of P.S. Eustis, General
Passenger Agent of the Burlington Railroad).
69. 1912 NPS hearing, supra note 34, at 7 (statement of Secretary of the
Interior Walter Lowrie Fisher). See also 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE,
supra note 23, at 131 (statement of E.B. Linnen, Inspector, Department of the
Interior) (stating that “[i]t is especially desirable that suitable accommodations be
provided in the parks for the many visitors where they may be lodged and fed”).
70. 1910 BALLINGER REPORT, supra note 27, at 59. See also ALBRIGHT &
SCHENCK, supra note 32, at 127 (noting the need for “accommodations for the
people of all incomes in a wide price range”).
71. Wanted, A National Park Service, OUTLOOK, Mar. 1, 1916, at 491.
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ineffective.” 72
The legislative history of the Organic Act is also notable for
what it does not say. There is no indication that Congress
sought to alter the purpose for which national parks had
already been created. Rather, the goal of the Organic Act was
to create an agency—the NPS—that could better manage both
the existing and future parks in a coordinated fashion
consistent with those existing purposes. 73 The meaning of the
Organic Act’s statement of the purpose of national parks may
thus be gleaned from the acts establishing national parks
immediately before and after Congress passed the Organic Act.
Indeed, NPS historian Richard Sellars described the process of
approving the Organic Act as “codifying tradition.” 74 The
statutes establishing national parks before the Organic Act
usually referred to the purpose of the parks as “the benefit and
enjoyment of the people,” and they directed the Secretary of the
Interior to preserve the scenery, wildlife, and other features of
the parks in their natural conditions. 75
The establishment acts enacted after the Organic Act
followed a similar pattern. Six months after Congress approved
the Organic Act, it established Mount McKinley National Park
“for the benefit and enjoyment of the people,” and it directed
the promulgation of regulations for
the care, protection, management, and improvement of the
same, the said regulations being primarily aimed at the
freest public use of the said park for recreation purposes by
the public and for the preservation of animals, birds, and
fish and for the preservation of the natural curiosities and
scenic beauties thereof. 76

72. A National Park Service, INDEPENDENT, May 29, 1916, at 321. The journal
supported the proposed legislation because it would “make possible the increasing
use by the people of these great national playgrounds.” Id.
73. See 1912 NPS hearing, supra note 34, at 3 (reprinting the bill “[t]o
establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes”).
74. SELLARS, supra note 27, at 28.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 17–19. See also ALBRIGHT & SCHENCK,
supra note 32, at 127 (recalling that “[e]very previous act demanded that the
parks be preserved in their natural state. Their natural state was wilderness.”);
SELLARS, supra note 27, at 26–27 (noting that “the history of the early national
park era suggests that a practical interest in recreational tourism in America’s
grand scenic areas triggered the park movement and perpetuated it”).
76. Act of Feb. 26, 1917, ch. 121, 39 Stat. 938 (1917) (establishing Mount
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Congress repeated the “benefit and enjoyment” command three
times in 1919 when it created the Grand Canyon, Lafayette
(now Acadia), and Zion National Parks. 77 In each of those
instances, and thereafter, Congress referred to the
management direction contained in the Organic Act rather
than separately stating the specific objects to be preserved in
each national park. 78
B. Interpreting the Organic Act
Most readers of the Organic Act read this history and
reach one of two different conclusions. For some, the Organic
Act prioritizes conservation over enjoyment. That is the
conclusion of the current iteration of the NPS management
policies, which states that “when there is a conflict between
conserving resources and values and providing for enjoyment of
them, conservation is to be predominant.” 79 In one sense, that
approach is self-evident. It would be impossible to enjoy
national parks if we did not conserve them. Or perhaps we
could enjoy them now without conserving them, but that would
contradict the statutory command that the parks be conserved
“for the enjoyment of future generations.” 80
But a strict understanding of conservation would prohibit
much of the enjoyment that the national parks were designed
to provide. Conservation was not an end in itself. The Organic
Act, in other words, did not view national parks in the same
way that the Wilderness Act later viewed wilderness areas as
places “where the earth and its community of life are
McKinley National Park).
77. See Act of Feb. 28, 1919, ch. 45, 40 Stat. 1178 (1919) (establishing
Lafayette National Park); Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 44, 40 Stat. 1175 (1919)
(establishing Grand Canyon National Park); Act of Nov. 19, 1919, 41 Stat. 356
(1919) (establishing Zion National Park).
78. See, e.g., Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-530, § 7(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. 2527, 2530 (providing that the national park
shall be administered in accordance with the Organic Act); Act of May 30, 1934, §
3, 48 Stat. 816 (providing that Everglades National Park shall be managed
pursuant to the Organic Act).
79. 2006 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 8, at 11.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The Organic Act was the first federal statute to refer
to future generations in the context of environmental conservation. Obligations to
future generations are now a prominent feature of environmental law. See, e.g.,
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(a), 83 Stat.
852, 852 (1970) (stating a national environmental policy for “present and future
generations of Americans”).
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untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain.” 81 The purpose of conserving the parks was so that
they could be enjoyed. As Professor Winks explained,
‘Enjoyment’ reasonably required access, and at the time
roads, trails, hotels, campgrounds, and administrative
facilities did not seem unduly invasive. The act cannot have
meant that ‘unimpaired’ was to be taken in its strictest
sense, particularly since the act included specific approval
for certain inevitably compromising actions: leasing for
tourist accommodation was the most obvious example. 82

The framers of the Organic Act were intent on attracting more
visitors to national parks, which runs counter to the notion
that they viewed conservation as more important than
enjoyment. Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., the author of the
Organic Act’s purpose statement, had “a deep-seated, constant
and compelling interest in and sympathy with, the people using
the parks.” 83 He wrote in 1911 of
the importance of some kind of legislative definition in
broad but unmistakable terms of the primary purpose for
which the parks and monuments are set apart, accompanied
by a prohibition of any use which is directly or indirectly in
conflict with that primary purpose without, however,
interfering with the serving of other purposes than the
primary purpose in so far as they do not in any degree
conflict with the most perfect service of the latter. 84

That is not to say that the purpose of the Organic Act was to
favor enjoyment over conservation, but it rebuts the claim that
conservation always trumps enjoyment.
The 2006 NPS management policies assert that courts
81. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 2(c), 78 Stat. 890, 891 (1964).
82. Winks, supra note 47, at 597. See also Coggins & Glicksman, supra note
40, at 761 (contending that “[i]t is far too late in history to argue that national
parks should be left totally in a state of nature, without any facilities or amenities
for human visitors. National parks were established for present enjoyment as well
as preservation, and most Americans could not use them without some support
services, whether guides or buses or roads or food.”).
83. ETHAN CARR, MISSION 66: MODERNISM AND THE NATIONAL PARK
DILEMMA 14 (2007).
84. Letter from Frederick Law Olmsted to J. Horace McFarland, Sept. 13,
1911 (excerpted in 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 19).
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have consistently interpreted the Organic Act to prioritize
conservation over enjoyment. 85 Not so. A lengthy dispute
involving the use of off-road vehicles (ORVs) in an ecologically
sensitive area of Canyonlands National Park illustrates the
dominant judicial approach to the Organic Act. 86 The NPS
developed a backcountry management plan that allowed ORVs
to travel along a road that crossed Salt Creek, the only yearround freshwater creek in the park, en route to a popular and
remote arch. 87 The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
(SUWA) challenged the plan as violating the Organic Act.88
The district court agreed. It explained that “the Park Service’s
mandate is to permit forms of enjoyment and access that are
consistent with preservation and inconsistent with significant,
permanent impairment.” 89 Applying that understanding, the
court held that allowing ORVs to use the road to reach the arch
“is inconsistent with this clear legislative directive.” 90 The
court noted that the NPS declined to close the road to vehicle
access “solely because of the popularity of four-wheel-drive
travel.” 91 That was not a sufficient reason, said the court,
because “‘visitor enjoyment’ as used in the statute refers to
visitor enjoyment of park scenery, wildlife, and natural and
historic objects that are to be preserved.” 92 The court further
explained that “[a]s used in this sense, visitor enjoyment does
not refer to visitor enjoyment of outdoor recreational
activities.” 93 The NPS had argued that the Organic Act allowed
“a balancing between competing mandates of resource
conservation and visitor enjoyment.” 94 Instead, the court
85. 2006 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 8, at 11.
86. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Utah
1998), rev’d, 222 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2000).
87. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 822–24 (10th
Cir. 2000) (summarizing the dispute).
88. See id. at 821–23.
89. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1212.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1211. The suggestion that the Organic Act requires a balance
between conservation and enjoyment may be a third way of interpreting the
Organic Act in addition to the two described in the text above. There is no
evidence in the text or history of the law, though, which supports the claim that a
balance is required. Rather, as described below, the best view is that the NPS is
afforded the discretion to pursue both goals as it deems best. Balancing is
permitted, but it is not required. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park
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concluded that the unique ecological features of the area and
“the availability of less-invasive forms of access” meant that
ORV use was contrary to “the Organic Act’s overarching goal of
resource protection.” 95 That is the clearest judicial statement
favoring the view that the Organic Act prioritizes conservation
over enjoyment. 96
The Tenth Circuit, however, held that the district court
improperly interpreted the Organic Act. “Although the Act and
the Canyonlands enabling legislation place an overarching
concern on preservation of resources,” the court observed, “we
read the Act as permitting the NPS to balance the sometimes
conflicting policies of resource conservation and visitor
enjoyment in determining what activities should be permitted
or prohibited.” 97 The proper question, explained the court, “is
Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190 (D. Utah 2005) (holding that “[t]he express
language of the Organic Act does not . . . mandate that the NPS equally balance
preservation with public use in making its management decision”).
95. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
96. See Keiter, supra note 54, at 247 (citing the district court’s decision);
Denis P. Galvin, The Organic Act—A User’s Guide: Further Thoughts on Winks’ “A
Contradictory Mandate?”, 24 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 22, 25 (2007). Keiter also cites
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975), which
relied in part on the Organic Act to require the Department of the Interior “to
afford as full protection as is reasonably possible to the timber, soil and streams
within the boundaries of the Redwood National Park from adverse consequences
of timbering and land use practices on lands located in the periphery of the Park
and on watershed tributaries to streams which flow into the Park . . . .” See
Keiter, supra note 54, at 247 n.35. But the district court did not interpret the
requirements of the Organic Act or explain how they applied to that case. Instead,
the court relied on the Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 79a, which the
court described as “a very unique statute—a statute which did more than
establish a national park; it also expressly vested the Secretary with authority to
take certain specifically stated steps designed to protect the Park from damage
caused by logging operations on the surrounding privately owned lands.” Sierra
Club, 398 F. Supp. at 286. Likewise, none of the other cases which have been cited
as demonstrating the Organic Act’s preference for conservation over enjoyment
actually held that a NPS decision violated the Act. See Fund for Animals v.
Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105, 108 n.12 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that the “NPS is
bound by a conservation mandate, and that mandate trumps all other
considerations,” but not actually reaching the Organic Act claim raised in the
case); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 909–10, 912
(D.D.C. 1986) (opining that “[i]n the Organic Act Congress speaks of but a single
purpose, namely, conservation,” but also acknowledging that the statutory
language may be “inconclusive” and noting that Congress gave the NPS
“responsibility for achieving the sometimes conflicting goals of preserving the
country’s natural resources for future generations while ensuring their enjoyment
by current users”).
97. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir.
2000).
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whether the resulting action leaves the resources ‘unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations.’” 98 The court further
noted both that it was unclear whether the use of the road by
ORVs would actually result in the impairment of the park, in
part because “impairment” is not defined in the Organic Act
and the phrase “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations” is inherently ambiguous. 99 The court reached that
conclusion without deferring to the NPS, which had changed its
interpretation of the Organic Act during the course of the
litigation so that there was “no current interpretation in front
of us that has been formally adopted by the agency.” 100 The
Tenth Circuit thus remanded the case for the NPS to apply the
correct impairment test. 101
Instead, on remand, the NPS adopted a different plan that
closed the road to ORVs, and this time it was the ORV users
who saw a violation of the Organic Act. According to the ORV
users, the closure of the road violated the Organic Act “because
it deprives members of the public the ability to use and enjoy
significant portions of Salt Creek Canyon.” 102 The NPS, by
contrast, relied on its newly approved 2001 management
guidelines, “which interpret[ed] the Organic Act as placing an
overarching concern on preservation of resources where there
is a conflict between conserving resources and providing for the
enjoyment of them.” 103 The district court got the Tenth
Circuit’s message. This time the court opined that “while the
Act clearly directs the NPS to regulate parks pursuant to broad
objectives, the agency is left with the task of further defining
and applying” the Act’s impairment standard. 104 The court
then deferred to the NPS’s “permissible” interpretation of the
law. 105
That is the second, alternative way in which courts and
commentators have read the Organic Act: instead of
prioritizing conservation over enjoyment, the Act is ambiguous
so the NPS has broad management discretion. Numerous
98. Id. at 827.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 829.
101. See id. at 830.
102. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178,
1181 (D. Utah 2005).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1189.
105. Id. at 1192.
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observers have concluded that the Organic Act is hopelessly
ambiguous as a source of law governing conflicts between
enjoyment and conservation. 106 That ambiguity means that the
NPS possesses the discretion to decide between enjoyment and
conservation in particular instances. Applying the familiar
Chevron test, courts routinely defer to the NPS’s interpretation
of the ambiguous commands of the Organic Act in cases pitting
conservation against enjoyment. 107 The general rule of judicial
review is that “because the Organic Act is silent as to the
specifics of park management, the [NPS] has especially broad
discretion on how to implement [its] statutory mandate.” 108
There is also evidence that Congress purposefully
delegated broad management authority to the NPS, rather
than simply presuming such discretion as the Court recognized
much later in Chevron. Federico Cheever contends that both
Stephen Mather, the founder of the NPS, and Gifford Pinchot,
106. See, e.g., EVERHART, supra note 43, at 80 (advising that “[t]he instruction
to preserve the parks unimpaired, while at the same time providing needed
facilities for public use, seems on first encounter to be ambiguous, perhaps even
meaningless, as a guideline”); Dennis J. Herman, Note, Loving Them to Death:
Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development in the National Parks, 11
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 17 (1992) (noting that “many scholars have argued that the
inherent ambiguity of the statutes makes them of little value in resolving conflicts
between preservation and use”); Gerald H. Suniville, The National Park Service
Organic Act: An Exercise in Conflict, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 75 (1979) (concluding that
“Congress ha[d] never really confronted or determined these difficult value
choices” when it enacted the Organic Act); Federico Cheever, The United States
Forest Service and National Park Service: Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful
Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 625,
639 (1997) (contending that “[a]lmost anything can be justified between the two
poles of ‘use’ and ‘preservation’” because those terms “do not significantly
constrain agency action”).
107. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
108. Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also, e.g., River
Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the
deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard to uphold the NPS’s decision to
allow the continued use of motorized rafts in the Grand Canyon National Park);
City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an Organic
Act claim against the NPS’s management of Fort Baker within the Golden Gate
National Recreation Area); Isle Royale Boaters Ass’n v. Norton, 330 F.3d 777, 782
(6th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the NPS’s “broad discretion” under the Organic
Act). See generally Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 40, at 741 (finding that
“Park Service discretion to limit recreational activities and facilities by
commercial enterprises has been upheld in every litigated instance located”);
Winks, supra note 47, at 616 (concluding that “[w]ith a few exceptions courts
overwhelmingly defer to the discretion of the NPS to regulate within the parks in
carrying out the mandates of the legislation”).
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the early head of the Forest Service, sought and received the
congressional approval to act as they thought best:
Men like Mather and Pinchot sought support from
Congress, but not direction. The legislative mandates they
lobbied for and, in large part, achieved, were so broad they
were almost meaningless. They received the authority to
operate with the blessing of Congress, but without
congressional supervision. Mather and Pinchot received
carte blanche. Neither man was a lawyer and therefore both
lacked a lawyer’s customary veneration of legislative text
and history. Both men were instrumentalists when it came
to Congress, using the assets at their disposal to extract
from Congress the authority they needed to further their
visions for the public land. 109

Cheever’s thesis draws support from the concerns of Secretary
of the Interior Walter Fisher, who worried in 1911 that the
proposed Organic Act would impose “too great restriction upon
administrative discretion” and would “allow any one who
claimed that any particular action would be detrimental to the
value of the parks might undertake to restrain the bureau from
the proposed action.” 110 Fisher acquiesced to the proposed draft
of the law only after he was assured that his fears about undue
constraint on the NPS were misplaced. On this account, the
Organic Act simply blesses the NPS’s efforts to achieve both
conservation and enjoyment.
The legal constraint on the NPS arises from the
impairment provision, not the statutory purposes of
conservation and enjoyment. 111 The Organic Act requires the
NPS to manage national parks in a manner that “will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 112
The NPS has interpreted the impairment provision to prohibit
an impact that, in the professional judgment of the
responsible NPS manager, would harm the integrity of park

109. Cheever, supra note 106, at 638.
110. See SELLARS, supra note 27, at 39–40.
111. See id. at 38 (noting that “‘unimpaired’ set the 1916 mandate’s only actual
standard” and “became the principal criterion against which preservation and use
of national parks have ever since been judged”).
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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resources or values, including the opportunities that
otherwise would be present for the enjoyment of those
resources or values. Whether an impact meets this
definition depends on the particular resources and values
that would be affected; the severity, duration, and timing of
the impact; the direct and indirect effects of the impact; and
the cumulative effects of the impact in question and other
impacts . . . . 113

The NPS tolerates some adverse impacts to park resources so
long as they do not “harm the integrity of park resources or
values,” and mitigation efforts can be employed to ensure that
adverse impacts do not rise to that standard or are otherwise
outweighed by the beneficial impacts of a project. These
conclusions are contained in the “determination of no
impairment” that the NPS issues whenever it approves a new
project for a park.
Several recent projects illustrate the NPS’s application of
the impairment standard. For example, the NPS determined
that its plan to modify the tourist facilities at Yosemite
National Park’s famed Mariposa Grove of Giant Sequoias
would not result in impairment “because there will be
beneficial effects on the giant sequoia ecosystem due to the
removal of infrastructure within the Grove and active
restoration efforts, and no permanent adverse impacts on
vegetation outside of the Grove.” 114 Likewise, efforts to restore
native ecosystems by removing pigs, goats, and other nonnative animals from Hawai’i Volcanoes National Park will not
result in impairment because “adverse impacts on vegetation
will be relatively limited, given appropriate mitigation, and
113. 2006 NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 8, at 11. The policies
further explain: “An impact would be more likely to constitute impairment to the
extent that it affects a resource or value whose conservation is necessary to fulﬁll
speciﬁc purposes identiﬁed in the establishing legislation or proclamation of the
park, or key to the natural or cultural integrity of the park or to opportunities for
enjoyment of the park, or identiﬁed in the park’s general management plan or
other relevant NPS planning documents as being of signiﬁcance. An impact would
be less likely to constitute an impairment if it is an unavoidable result of an
action necessary to preserve or restore the integrity of park resources or values
and it cannot be further mitigated.” Id.
114. NAT’L PARK SERV., DETERMINATION OF NO IMPAIRMENT: RESTORATION
PLAN FOR MARIPOSA GROVE OF GIANT SEQUOIAS, in RECORD OF DECISION,
RESTORATION OF THE MARIPOSA GROVE OF GIANT SEQUOIAS, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (2013).
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will be offset by the expected recovery of vegetation associated
with the removal of non-native ungulates.” 115 Nor did the
reconfiguration of roads and facilities in northern Washington’s
Lake Chelan National Recreation Area in response to flooding
and erosion result in impairment even though it would have
significant impact on soils, a possibly moderate adverse effect
on 7.5 acres of habitat suitable for northern spotted owls, and
“some long-term adverse effect on scenic resources” along a
rerouted section of road. 116 Similarly, the NPS concluded that
its oil and gas management plan for the Big Thicket National
Preserve adjacent to the Everglades would not result in
impairment because the plan was “intended to protect the
Preserve’[s] natural and cultural resources, and provide for
high-quality visitor experiences, while providing holders of oil
and gas rights reasonable access for exploration and
development.” 117 Moreover, the plan “would have negligible to
moderate adverse impacts on” the park’s resources, and
“localized, negligible, and short-term” effects on visitor
experiences. 118 The no-impairment decision also assumed “the
successful implementation of the protective measures included
in the [plan].” 119
The courts have afforded substantial deference to NPS
impairment decisions. In one recent case, the NPS found that
approving an expanded electric transmission line across an
existing right-of-way in the Delaware River Gap National
Recreation Area, the Middle Delaware National Scenic and
Recreational River, and the Appalachian National Scenic Trail
would not impair the area’s scenic or other values. 120 The
National Parks Conservation Association disagreed, insisting
that the transmission line would “permanently scar the
landscape and degrade the visitor experience in some of the
115. NAT’L PARK SERV., HAWAI’I VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARK, FINAL
PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR PROTECTING AND RESTORING
NATIVE ECOSYSTEMS BY MANAGING NON-NATIVE UNGULATES A-3 (2013).
116. NAT’L PARK SERV., RECORD OF DECISION, STEHEKIN RIVER CORRIDOR
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, LAKE CHELAN NATIONAL RECREATION AREA, NORTH
CASCADES NATIONAL PARK SERVICE COMPLEX 17, 20, 23 (2013).
117. NAT’L PARK SERV., RECORD OF DECISION, OIL AND GAS MANAGEMENT
PLAN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, BIG THICKET NATIONAL PRESERVE,
TEXAS 10 (2006).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C.
2013).

NAGLE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

888

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

3/29/2015 2:46 PM

[Vol. 86

most visited national parks in the country.” 121 But the court
employed a very deferential standard of review that the NPS
easily satisfied. It emphasized “that ‘[b]ecause the Organic Act
is silent as to the specifics of park management, the Secretary
has especially broad discretion on how to implement his
statutory mandate.’” 122 The court agreed with the substantive
understanding of the impairment standard articulated in the
NPS’s policy guidelines, and stressed that the agency had
explained its rationale. 123 The court held that the NPS’s
impairment decision satisfied that arbitrary and capricious
standard of judicial review.
The Organic Act as correctly interpreted by the courts thus
affords the NPS substantial discretion to manage national
parks as it deems best, so the real question is what the NPS
deems best. The NPS has alternately emphasized enjoyment
and conservation during its ninety-seven-year history. Two
years after Congress enacted the Organic Act, Secretary of the
Interior Franklin Lane advised NPS Director Stephen Mather
that national park management should conform to
three broad principles: First that the national parks must
be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the use of
future generations as well as those of our own time; second,
that they are set apart for the use, observation, health, and
pleasure of the people; and third, that the national interest
must dictate all decisions affecting public or private
enterprise in the parks. 124

Conservation was easy when so many parks were so
121. Press Release, Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, Conservation Grps.
Challenge Approval of Power Line Planned to Cut Through Treasured Nat’l Parks
(Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.npca.org/news/media-center/pressreleases/2012/conservation-groups-challenge-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
47FB-E982.
122. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (quoting Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359,
365 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
123. See id. at 84–85.
124. Secretary Lane’s Letter on National Park Management, May 13, 1918,
reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 48. Lane’s letter
also stated that “[e]very opportunity should be afforded the public, wherever
possible, to enjoy the national parks in the manner that best satisfies the
individual taste. Automobiles and motorcycles will be permitted in all of the
national parks; in fact, the parks will be kept accessible by any means
practicable.” Id. at 49–50. In fact, Horace Albright later claimed that he wrote the
letter on behalf of Lane. See also ALBRIGHT & SCHENCK, supra note 32, at 274–76.
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inaccessible to potential visitors. The early years of the NPS
featured extensive efforts to build railroads and roads that
would enable tourists to visit the national parks. 125 The success
of those efforts produced a predictable backlash from those who
feared that the national parks were being “loved to death” by
the presence of too many visitors. 126 The 1960s introduced an
emphasis on the ecological value of the national parks. 127 Most
recently, debates over NPS policy provoked multiple
congressional hearings and popular debate over the revised
management policies that were finalized in 2006. 128
Conservation advocates look at this history and see a
problematic tendency to favor enjoyment over conservation.
Such concerns date back to the 1940s, when the National Parks
Conservation Association proposed two separate types of parks:
a “National Primeval Park System” for “the older, larger
parks,” and a different category for newer, recreational
areas. 129 Most scholarship favors a more explicit preference for
conservation over enjoyment. 130 As a result, some have called
on Congress to codify a preference for preservation that would
empower courts to engage in more active judicial review of park
management decisions that prioritize enjoyment over
preservation. 131 But legislation to amend the Organic Act
125. See ROBERT B. KEITER, TO CONSERVE UNIMPAIRED: THE
THE NATIONAL PARK IDEA 41–63 (2013).
126. See RUNTE, supra note 29, at 155 (noting complaints

EVOLUTION OF

about “[p]arks
overrun like convention cities, ‘industrial tourism,’ and the ecological effects of
‘providing opportunities for mass recreation’”); ISE, supra note 1, at 7 (referring to
“swarming hordes” of visitors). See generally CONRAD L. WIRTH, PARKS, POLITICS,
AND THE PEOPLE 1 (1980) (summarizing the evolution of NPS policy regarding
enjoyment and conservation of the parks).
127. A.S. LEOPOLD ET AL., WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL PARKS:
THE LEOPOLD REPORT (1963), available at http://www.craterlakeinstitute.com/
online-library/leopold-report/complete.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/AQ5QF37P.
128. See, e.g., National Park Service’s Draft Management Policies Hearing,
supra note 7.
129. See NAT’L PARKS ASS’N, NATIONAL PRIMEVAL PARK STANDARDS: A
DECLARATION OF POLICY (1945), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM,
supra note 4, at 174. See also ISE, supra note 1, at 437–39 (describing the
proposal).
130. See Herman, supra note 106, at 24 (asserting that “[t]oo often in the
history of the parks, when proposed uses conflicted with preservation goals, use
and development have won out”); Michael Mantell, Preservation and Use:
Concessions in the National Parks, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 2 (1979) (contending that
“the use function of the parks embodied in the NPS Organic Act has received far
more congressional and managerial attention than the preservation function”).
131. See Denise E. Antolini, National Park Law in the U.S.: Conservation and
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toward that end failed, leaving the relationship between
preservation and enjoyment to the discretion of the NPS. 132
The result is that the Organic Act allows the NPS to
promote conservation and enjoyment as it deems best in
particular instances. That discretion is normatively valuable.
The NPS has developed extensive professional expertise in the
environmental conditions and the use of national parks in its
nearly one hundred years of existence. The NPS has proven
adept at exercising its discretion differently over the years in
response to changing environmental, political, and social
conditions. Robert Keiter’s masterful book shows how the NPS
has promoted national parks as wilderness sanctuaries, tourist
attractions, recreational sites, cultural resources, scientific and
educational venues, wildlife reserves, and managed
ecosystems—and how it now accommodates all of those visions
of national parks and more. 133 That is not to say that the NPS
always gets its management decisions right, or that the NPS
moves quickly enough to incorporate evolving values into
national park management. But the record of the NPS justifies
the general management discretion that the Organic Act gives
it.
II. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The Organic Act is just the first component of national
park law. A collection of federal environmental statutes
imposes additional obligations on the NPS as it manages
national parks. Four statutes in particular generate the most
challenges to NPS management decisions: the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Wilderness Act, the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Wild & Scenic Rivers
Act (WSRA). Unlike the vast majority of Organic Act litigation,
lawsuits asserting that the NPS has violated one of those four
statutes are more likely to succeed. Such litigation
Conflict, 33 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 851, 858 (2009) (advocating the
amendment of the Organic Act to “unequivocally put conservation of the parks’
unique resources first and promotion of human ‘enjoyment’ second”); Anne
Batchelor, Public Access to National Parks: The Case for Restraint, 1 ST. THOMAS
L. F. 111 (1988) (same).
132. See Antolini, supra note 131, at 917–18.
133. See KEITER, supra note 125. Elsewhere, Keiter outlined the “compelling”
case for retaining the Organic Act as originally written. Keiter, supra note 54, at
246.
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demonstrates that the discretion available to the NPS shrinks
when these statutes require management more favorable to
conservation than the Organic Act itself. 134 By contrast, no
statute pushes the NPS in the opposite direction of
encouraging greater use instead of conservation.
This section will focus on these four statutes, but it should
be noted that many other environmental statutes guide NPS
decisions as well. The management plans prepared by each
NPS unit confirm the importance of other environmental
statutes. For example, the new plan for Guadalupe Mountains
National Park lists over one hundred federal statutes that
affect the management of that park, ranging from the familiar
(the Clean Air Act and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act) to
the obscure (such as the American Folklife Preservation Act of
1976 and the Federal Cave Resources Protection Act of
1988). 135 The plan describes the conditions to be achieved at
Guadalupe Mountains National Park based on service-wide
mandates and policies in a table that contains separate goals
for air quality, backcountry, ecosystem management, exotic
species, fire management, floodplains, geological resources,
land protection, lightscape management, native vegetation and
animals, natural resource restoration, natural soundscapes,
paleontological resources, soils, threatened and endangered
species, water resources, wetlands and wilderness—along with
six cultural resources topics, three topics related to visitor use,
and five more general topics. 136 Similar provisions apply to
other units of the national park system. 137 As noted, though,
134. See KEITER, supra note 125, at 266 (observing that “[w]here the Organic
Act once stood preeminent as the most powerful federal law promoting nature
conservation, laws like the Wilderness Act and the Endangered Species Act
extend additional—and, in some cases, greater—protection to the national parks
and their resources”); Keiter, supra note 54, at 242 (noting that “[t]hese crosscutting environmental laws have not only influenced how the Park Service
addresses its management responsibilities, but they can override inconsistent
park management policies or decisions”); Winks, supra note 47, at 619 (citing the
CWA, ESA, WSRA, and the Wilderness Act as among the environmental statutes
that “may be able to be exploited to help the NPS protect resources . . . in the
parks”) (emphasis added).
135. See NAT’L PARK SERV., GUADALUPE MOUNTAINS NATIONAL PARK, TEXAS,
GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 297–300
(2013).
136. See id. at 8–11.
137. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, BADLANDS NATIONAL PARK NORTH UNIT
12–21 (2006) (explaining management principles and strategies).
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NEPA, the Wilderness Act, the ESA, and the WSRA impose the
most environmental obligations on the management of national
parks, so I will turn to them now.
A. National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA states an eponymous national environmental policy,
but it is far better known for requiring federal agencies to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) whenever
they engage in activities that could substantially affect the
environment. 138 The NPS must comply with NEPA whenever it
proposes new management activities.
The NPS expends substantial time and resources to comply
with NEPA. 139 For example, the NPS recently analyzed five
alternative approaches to managing feral pigs and other nonnative ungulates in Hawai’i Volcanoes National Park,
concluding that it would be best to adopt a flexible approach
that employed a combination of fencing, relocation, and lethal
techniques. 140 Another recent EIS considered six alternatives
to ORV use in Wrangell-St. Elias National Park & Preserve,
including the NPS’s preferred alternative that would improve
all trails to a maintainable standard for recreational ORV use
in the National Preserve, but not in the National Park. 141
Additionally, the NPS reviewed the proposed modification of a
controversial sixty-six-mile backcountry road that passes
through the southern portion of Capitol Reef National Park. 142
NEPA challenges to NPS management decisions are
commonplace. In 2013 alone, the NPS won all six reported
federal court cases reviewing the agency’s compliance with
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2012) (requiring the preparation of an
environmental impact statement for “major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment”).
139. Some argue that the NPS spends too much time complying with NEPA.
See Antolini, supra note 131, at 901–02 (asserting that “NEPA undermines the
NPS conservation mandate” because “[i]n some cases, NEPA is simply a litigation
tool wielded by the NPS or private-use groups to justify agency decisions that
promote the use and enjoyment of the National Parks over conservation”).
140. See NAT’L PARK SERV., HAWAI’I VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARK, supra note
115, at i–vi.
141. See NAT’L PARK SERV., NABESNA OFF-ROAD VEHICLE MANAGEMENT PLAN
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT i (2011).
142. See NAT’L PARK SERV., BURR TRAIL MODIFICATIONS FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/ASSESSMENT OF EFFECT (2005). A full list
with links to current and past NPS NEPA documents is available at
http://parkplanning.nps.gov, archived at http://perma.cc/3AD9-UPZ3.
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NEPA. 143 The agency’s record then slipped in 2014. One court
held that the NPS failed to comply with NEPA concerning the
opening of ORV trails in the Big Cypress National Preserve.144
Another court held that the NPS failed to consider all of the
appropriate alternatives to proposed fish hatchery programs
planned in the aftermath of removing a dam within Olympia
National Park. 145
The willingness of outside parties to litigate NEPA cases
against the NPS ensures that the agency takes its statutory
responsibilities seriously. Moreover, courts have overturned
NPS decisions for failing to fulfill NEPA’s study requirements.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, rejected the NPS’s conclusion
that the authorization of more cruise ships to visit Glacier Bay
National Park would not have a significant impact on the
environment, and thus did not necessitate an EIS. 146 The NPS
had proposed a research and monitoring program to learn the
effects that increased cruise traffic could have on the park’s
wildlife. 147 The court, however, held, “[t]hat is precisely the
information and understanding that is required before a
decision that may have a significant adverse impact on the
environment is made, and precisely why an EIS must be
143. See, e.g., Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that the NPS did not need to complete a new EIS before deciding
not to renew a special use permit for oyster farming in Point Reyes National
Seashore); WildEarth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir.
2013) (holding that the NPS reasonably declined to consider the introduction of
wolves as an alternative approach to reducing the elk population in Rocky
Mountain National Park); River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the NPS adequately studied the effects of rafting in
Grand Canyon National Park); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, 965 F.
Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that the NPS took the required “hard look” at
the effects of authorizing an expanded power line through the Delaware Water
Gap National Recreation Area); Coalition to Protect Cowles Bog Area v. Salazar,
No. 2:12–CV–515, 2013 WL 3338491 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that the NPS relied
on accurate information and considered enough alternatives to cutting down 3,400
trees in order to restore Cowles Bog to a wetlands prairie); Grunewald v. Jarvis,
930 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that the NPS properly considered the
effects of invasive plants, the impacts on park visitors, and the possibility of
reproductive controls when it decided to authorize the culling of deer within Rock
Creek Park).
144. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, No. 2:13-cv-364-FtM-38DNF,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72522 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2014).
145. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Nat’l Park Serv., No. C12-5109 BHS, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 41715 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2014).
146. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 725–26 (9th
Cir. 2001).
147. See id. at 727–28.
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prepared in this case.” 148 The NPS, in other words, must
complete its study of the environmental effects of a proposed
project before deciding to engage in that project.
B. Wilderness Act
There are nearly 44 million acres of wilderness areas
located on NPS lands. 149 The Wilderness Act directs federal
agencies to manage congressionally designated wilderness
areas to preserve their wilderness values, in part by
prohibiting
any
motorized
vehicles
or
commercial
150
Those restrictions impose a more stringent
enterprises.
conservation requirement than the Organic Act. The NPS itself
recently stated that “[t]he goal of wilderness stewardship is to
keep these areas as natural and wild as possible in the face of
competing purposes and impacts brought on by activities that
take place elsewhere in the park and beyond park
boundaries.” 151 Even so, Sandi Zellmer recently concluded that
the “NPS has been loath to embrace its wilderness
148. Id. at 733 (“The Parks Service’s lack of knowledge does not excuse the
preparation of an EIS; rather it requires the Parks Service to do the necessary
work to obtain it.”).
149. See Wilderness Statistics Reports, WILDERNESS.NET, http://www.
wilderness.net/NWPS/chartResults?chartType=acreagebyagency (last visited Nov.
30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XNW2-QQ84. The NPS manages more acres
of wilderness lands than any other federal agency. See id. (reporting that the NPS
manages 43.9 million acres, the Forest Service manages 36.1 million acres, the
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service manages 20.7 million acres, and the Bureau of Land
Management manages 8.8 million acres). The Wilderness Act defines “wilderness”
“as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain” and as “an area of
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed
so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have
been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of
land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other
features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)
(2012).
150. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1132. Wilderness areas occur within four types of
federal lands: national parks managed by the NPS, national forests managed by
the Forest Service, wildlife refuges managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the public domain lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management. See id. §§ 1133–1134.
151. NAT’L PARK SERV., DIRECTOR’S ORDER # 41: WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP 7
(2013) (emphasis added).
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management policies as concrete, enforceable, on-the-ground
commitments, and that it has failed to take wilderness
planning terribly seriously.” 152
The Wilderness Act pushes national park planning toward
actions designed to favor conservation over use. In Death
Valley National Park, for example, the purpose of the 2012
wilderness and backcountry stewardship plan was “to provide a
framework by which to preserve and improve wilderness
character while providing for unique visitor opportunities for
quiet, solitude, and primitive adventure.” 153 Similarly, when
managing fires within the wilderness area of Saguaro National
Park, the NPS committed to conduct such activities “in
accordance with the Wilderness Act (using the Minimum
Requirement Decision Analysis) and Minimum Impact
Suppression Tactics (MIST).” 154
Courts have invoked the Wilderness Act to overturn NPS
management decisions. The Cumberland Island National
Seashore authorized the use of vans to transport visitors
through the wilderness area to the historic ruined resorts
outside of the wilderness area, asserting that such historic
interpretation was within the NPS’s discretion. 155 But the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that “the preservation
of historic structures furthers the goals of the Wilderness Act,”
and the court concluded that “the overall purpose and structure
of the Wilderness Act demonstrate that Congress has
unambiguously prohibited the Park Service from offering
motorized transportation to park visitors through the
wilderness area.” 156 Similarly, when the NPS wanted to restore
152. Sandra B. Zellmer, Wilderness Management in National Parks and
Wildlife Refuges, 44 ENVTL. L. 497, 537 (2014).
153. NAT’L PARK SERV., DEATH VALLEY NATIONAL PARK WILDERNESS AND
BACKCOUNTRY STEWARDSHIP PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT iii (2012)
(noting that the backcountry (as opposed to wilderness) provisions of the plan are
designed “to accommodate continued use of the park’s unpaved roads and
protection of backcountry resources”).
154. NAT’L PARK SERV., RECORD OF DECISION, FIRE MANAGEMENT PLAN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, SAGUARO NATIONAL PARK, ARIZONA (2007).
For another example of NPS compliance with the Wilderness Act, see NAT’L PARK
SERV., RECORD OF DECISION, GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN / WILDERNESS STUDY
/ ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, GREAT SAND DUNES NATIONAL PARK AND
PRESERVE 2 (2007) (advising that “[m]ost of Great Sand Dunes National Park and
Preserve will remain wild and undeveloped”).
155. Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1090 (11th Cir. 2004).
156. Id. at 1091, 1094. Congress responded by redrawing the boundaries of the
wilderness area in order to allow the van trips. The Cumberland Wilderness
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two historic cabins in Olympic National Park that had
collapsed under the natural effects of weather and time, a
Washington district court held that the reconstruction of the
shelters off-site and the use of a helicopter to return them to
their original location violated the mandate to preserve the
wilderness character of the wilderness area within the national
park. 157
In other instances, the courts have sustained NPS
decisions that were taken to further the goals of the Wilderness
Act. Recreational boaters sued the NPS for relocating docks
and otherwise limiting access to Isle Royale National Park, but
the court held that those actions “further[ed] the Wilderness
Act’s goal of providing a ‘contrast’ to ‘those areas where man
and his own works dominate the landscape.’” 158 More recently,
the NPS allowed a commercial oyster farm’s permit to operate
within Point Reyes National Seashore to expire because
Congress had designated the area as “potential wilderness”
that would become an actual wilderness area once the uses of
the area that were inconsistent with the Wilderness Act
ceased. 159 In each instance, the NPS had to manage national
parks according to the constraints of the Wilderness Act, rather
than simply relying on the broad commands of the Organic Act.
C. Endangered Species Act
The ESA prohibits any federal actions that would
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or that
would destroy or adversely affect its designated critical
habitat. 160 Over 400 endangered species depend on national
parks for their survival, including grizzly bears in Glacier and
Yellowstone National Parks, Florida panthers in the
Everglades National Park, and numerous birds in Haleakala
National Park. 161 Congress established the newest national
Boundary Adjustment Act, Public Law 108-447, 118 Stat. 3074 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 459i (2012)).
157. Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, No. C04-5732FDB, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44230 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2005).
158. Isle Royale Boaters Ass’n v. Norton, 330 F.3d 777, 784 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)).
159. See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2014).
160. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
161. See NAT’L PARK SERV., 2010 SPECIES STATUS SUMMARY (2010) (listing 421
listed species occurring in 1,112 populations within NPS units).
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park—Pinnacles National Park, just south of San Francisco—
in part because the area is the site of the successful
reintroduction of the highly endangered California condor to
the wild. 162
The NPS has also reintroduced several endangered species
to national parks. In addition to the California condors in
Pinnacles National Park, the NPS has reintroduced blackfooted ferrets to Badlands National Park, nēnē to Hawaii
Volcanoes National Park, and fishers to Olympic National
Park. 163 Most famously, beginning in the 1990s, the NPS
reintroduced wolves to Yellowstone National Park, where they
once had been systematically exterminated. 164 The wolves
thrived so much that they are no longer endangered. 165 Such
reintroduction efforts are actually required by the ESA, but
they demonstrate the NPS’s interest in fulfilling the ESA’s
purposes.
The courts have upheld NPS decisions to preserve
endangered species even at the cost of reducing opportunities
to enjoy the national parks. For example, the statute that
created Voyageurs National Park contains an exception to the
general prohibition on snowmobiles within national parks, but
the NPS decided to exclude snowmobiles from certain parts of
Voyageurs because of the possible effect on endangered gray
162. See Pinnacles National Park Act, Pub. L. No. 112-245, §2(5), 126 Stat.
2385 (2013) (finding that “Pinnacles National Monument is the only National
Park System site within the ancestral home range of the California Condor. The
reintroduction of the condor to its traditional range in California is important to
the survival of the species . . . .”).
163. See Press Release, Olympic Nat’l Park, Fourteen Fishers Released
Yesterday in Olympic National Park (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.nps.gov/olym/parknews/fourteen-fishers-released-yesterday-inolympic-national-park.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/82UY-XX5G; Black-Footed
Ferret, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/species/mammals/blackfootedferret (last updated Jan. 8, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/R2LR-AY8P (documenting the black-footed ferret recovery effort);
Nēnē—Hawai’i Volcanoes, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/havo/
naturescience/nene.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
4HNG-48FF.
164. See DOUGLAS W. SMITH & GARY FERGUSON, DECADE OF THE WOLF:
RETURNING THE WILD TO YELLOWSTONE (2005) (describing the reintroduction of
wolves to Yellowstone National Park).
165. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule To
Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct
Population Segment and To Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. 15123 (proposed Apr. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17). But see Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, No. 12-1833(ABJ), 2014 WL 4714847
(D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2014) (overturning the delisting of wolves in Wyoming).
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wolves and bald eagles. 166 The NPS took that action, even
though the ESA did not actually require it, because the FWS
acknowledged that the snowmobiles would not actually
jeopardize the existence of the species. 167 Nonetheless, the NPS
acted pursuant to the enabling act’s authority to close areas to
snowmobiles for the purposes of “wildlife management.” 168
In other instances, courts have rejected claims that the
NPS neglected to comply with its ESA duties, holding instead
that the challenged NPS management decisions satisfied all of
the demands of the ESA and thus remained within the
discretion of the agency. 169
D. Wild & Scenic Rivers Act
Congress enacted the WSRA in 1968 in order to protect
designated rivers in their free-flowing condition. 170 Sections of
203 rivers have been designated pursuant to the Act, including
37 that flow, at least in part, within national parks. 171 The Act
distinguishes between “wild” rivers (which “represent vestiges
of primitive America”); “scenic” rivers (which are free of
impoundments
and
“still
largely
primitive . . .
and
undeveloped,” but which are “accessible in places by roads”);
and “recreational” rivers (which are readily accessible, perhaps
developed, and may have been impounded in the past). 172 The
agency responsible for managing a designated river must
“protect and enhance the values which caused it to be included
166. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997).
167. See id. at 664 (noting that “the FWS concluded that the NPS’s proposed
wilderness plan would not jeopardize the animals’ survival or adversely affect
their critical habitats”).
168. See id.; 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b)(3) (2014).
169. See, e.g., City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting an ESA claim against the NPS management of Fort Baker within the
Golden Gate National Recreation Area); Voyageurs Nat’l Park Ass’n v. Norton,
381 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an ESA claim against the reopening of
eleven bays for snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987) (holding that the continued
operation of a campground within Yellowstone National Park did not threaten the
survival of the grizzly bear and thus did not violate the ESA).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2012).
171. See NAT’L PARK SERV., WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS TASK FORCE, WILD AND
SCENIC RIVERS: CHARTING THE COURSE, NAVIGATING THE NEXT 40 YEARS OF THE
WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT 7 (2007) (reporting the number of wild and scenic
rivers in national parks as of 2006).
172. Id. at 30.
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in said system without . . . limiting other uses that do not
substantially interfere with public use and enjoyment of these
values.” 173 In doing so, the NPS or other managing agency
must prepare a comprehensive management plan that “shall
address resource protection, development of lands and
facilities, user capacities, and other management practices
necessary or desirable to achieve the purposes of” the act.174
The WSRA expressly states that its requirements are in
addition to those imposed by the Organic Act. 175
Yosemite National Park offers the most significant
illustration of the preservationist requirements that the WSRA
imposes on the NPS. Congress designated the Merced River
pursuant to the WSRA in 1987. 176 The designation included 81
miles within the national park and another 41 miles as the
river flows outside the national park through land managed by
the Forest Service and BLM. 177 The Merced River makes “a
dramatic entry into Yosemite Valley, rushing over towering
cliffs in prominent waterfalls” and then flowing through the
part of the national park that attracts the vast majority of its
visitors. 178 The river’s designation triggered a statutory
requirement that the NPS prepare a comprehensive
management plan within three years, but thirteen years
passed before a lawsuit forced the agency to complete its
plan. 179

173. 16 U.S.C. § 1281(a).
174. Id. § 1274(d).
175. See id. § 1281(c) (providing that “in case of conflict between the provisions
of [the WSRA and the Organic Act], the more restrictive provisions shall apply”).
176. See Act of Nov. 2, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-149, 101 Stat. 879 (1987) (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(62)(A) (2012)).
177. See NAT’L PARK SERV., MERCED WILD AND SCENIC RIVER FINAL
COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
1-2 (2014) [hereinafter FINAL MERCED WSR PLAN].
178. See id. at 1–2.
179. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1263 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(giving NPS 12 months to adopt a plan for the Merced River).
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Merced Wild and Scenic River Segment Boundaries and
Classifications 180
The Ninth Circuit invalidated both the 2000 plan and a
revised plan that the NPS prepared in 2005. 181 In its first
decision, the district court upheld the 2000 NPS plan, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed. 182 The appeals court emphasized that
the WSRA mandates that a management plan “must
address . . . user capacities,” which the court interpreted to
require “specific measurable limits on use” of the river. 183 The
NPS then prepared a revised plan that it released in 2005, but
this time both the district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed
180. FINAL MERCED WSR PLAN, supra note 177, at 3-2.
181. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton (Norton II), 348 F.3d 789, 797 (9th
Cir. 2003); Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th
Cir. 2008).
182. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton (Norton I), 194 F. Supp. 2d 1066,
1120–21 (E.D. Cal. 2002) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, (Norton II), 348 F.3d 789 (9th
Cir. 2003) opinion clarified, (Norton III) 366 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004)
183. Norton II, 348 F.3d at 797 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1) (2012)). See also
Norton III, 366 F.3d at 731 (clarifying that the entire 2000 NPS plan was “invalid
due to two deficiencies: (1) a failure to adequately address user capacities; and (2)
the improper drawing of the Merced River’s boundaries at El Portal”).
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that the new plan violated the WSRA, too. The problem with
the 2005 plan was that it focused solely on future harm to the
Merced River, while ignoring “the problem of past degradation”
of the river. 184
The NPS tried again with a draft plan that it released in
January 2013. 185 The NPS studied six alternative plans that
would accommodate between 13,900 and 21,800 visitors in
Yosemite Valley each day by reducing or increasing lodging,
parking, and visitor facilities. As the NPS explained:
Under all alternatives, several structures and facilities will
be removed, such as recreational facilities—such as pools,
bike rentals, and the ice rink—abandoned bridge footings,
and large stretches of riprap. All action alternatives propose
a 150-foot riparian buffer to insulate the river from new
development and protect views from the bed and banks. The
ecological restoration program, included in all action
alternatives, would also address disturbance in meadows,
along riparian zones, and on riverbanks. The plan
alternatives vary when addressing new development or
relocation / removal of existing lodging, campsites, parking,
and housing. 186

The NPS’s preferred plan would have maintained visitation at
its recent level of around 19,900 people per day. 187 It would
have done so by significantly increasing the number of
campsites in Yosemite Valley while reducing commercial
services. 188 The plan generated substantial controversy,
though, so the NPS modified it when it released its final plan
in February 2014. 189 The final plan allows ice skating, rafting,
and bicycling facilities to remain within the valley, but it
otherwise retains the provisions contained in the January 2013
proposed plan. 190 It remains to be seen whether those changes
184. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d at 1035. The court also held that the NPS violated
the WSRA by failing to include all of the elements of the plan in a single
document. See id. at 1036.
185. See NAT’L PARK SERV., MERCED WILD AND SCENIC RIVER DRAFT
COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(2013).
186. Id. at ES-11.
187. Id. at ES-16.
188. Id.
189. See FINAL MERCED WSR PLAN, supra note 177.
190. Id. at ES-4.
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will satisfy the vocal demands of the park’s users who resist
any removal of recreational facilities or any limits on
visitors. 191 But one thing is clear: the argument that the
Organic Act and the Yosemite National Park enabling
legislation “should take precedence over the Wild and Scenic
River Act” is wrong as a matter of law. 192 The WSRA demands
a greater emphasis on conservation than exists in national
parks unencumbered by that law, and those more restrictive
provisions add to the law that the NPS must follow.
*****
NEPA, the Wilderness Act, the ESA, and the WSRA
ensure that the NPS manages national parks in a way that
considers all environmental values, avoids interference with
wilderness areas, and protects biodiversity. Other federal
environmental statutes pursue similar goals. The Clean Water
Act prevents water pollution and protects wetlands within
national parks. 193 The National Historic Preservation Act
mandates consideration of the cultural resources in national
parks. 194 These and many other federal statutes add to the
Organic Act’s command to conserve national parks by requiring
specific management actions to conserve particular national
park resources. They act as a check on any temptation that the
NPS would encounter to prioritize enjoyment over conservation
in certain instances. They thus ensure that the most important
environmental and cultural values codified in federal law are
protected in our most important environmental and cultural
places, those which Congress has designated national parks.
III. SPECIFIC PLACE-BASED MANAGEMENT STATUTES
The Organic Act gives the NPS broad discretion to
navigate the competing demands of providing for the
conservation and the enjoyment of national parks, while
numerous federal environmental statutes push that
191. See generally Public Impacts of Closing Amenities at Yosemite National
Park: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands & Envtl. Regulation
of the H. Natural Res. Comm., 113th Cong. (2013).
192. Id. at 18 (statement of Wendy Brown, Yosemite for Everyone).
193. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
194. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a–470w-6 (2012).
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management in the direction of conservation. The push back
toward enjoyment results from statutory provisions that
Congress enacts for specific parks. Those provisions are either
prospective or responsive. The prospective management
commands appear in the acts that Congress approves to
establish a national park. The responsive commands are
contained in statutes or appropriations riders that Congress
enacts to mandate a different management policy than had
been adopted by the NPS. There are instances in which such
specific statutory management commands require more
conservation, but most such provisions call for more enjoyment
of national parks.
This section begins by explaining how the statutes
establishing new national parks often contain provisions
directing that the park be managed in a particular way that
departs from the commands of the Organic Act. Next it notes
that congressional appropriations statutes play an important
role in national park management by providing funding that
inevitably allows some management projects but not others.
The final part of this section analyzes how Congress responds
to NPS management choices by attempting to dictate a
different result. Three case studies—involving Cape Hatteras
National Recreational Seashore, Yukon Charley National
Preserve, and Fort Vancouver National Historic Site—show the
many tools that Congress employs to achieve its desired
outcome.
A. Park-Specific Establishment Acts
Only Congress can establish a national park. 195 When it
does so, Congress typically requires that the new unit be
managed consistent with the Organic Act. 196 But those
establishment acts also contain specific provisions for the
management of the new national park.
Several provisions either require or prohibit roads and
other means of transportation within specific national parks.
The 1929 Grand Teton National Park establishment legislation
prohibited the construction of any roads, hotels, or other
195. The President, however, may create national monuments pursuant to the
Antiquities Act, and those monuments are often placed under the authority of the
NPS. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2012).
196. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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lodging. 197 Similarly, the law creating North Cascades National
Park prohibited the construction of a road “from the North
Cross State Highway to the Stehekin Road” or a road that
would provide “permanent . . . vehicular access between May
Creek and Hozomeen along the east side of Ross Lake.” 198 By
contrast, the Canyonlands National Park Act contains a
provision instructing the Secretary of the Interior to locate a
road or roads “to provide suitable access to the [park] and
services required in the operation and administration of the
park.” 199 The law establishing Assateague Island National
Seashore specifies that a road shall be constructed along its
length. 200 And the Voyageurs National Park statute authorizes
“appropriate provisions for (1) winter sports, including the use
of snowmobiles, (2) use by seaplanes, and (3) recreational use
by all types of watercraft, including houseboats, runabouts,
canoes, sailboats, fishing boats, and cabin cruisers.” 201
Hunting, fishing, and trapping are another common
subject of national park establishment legislation. When
Congress established the Great Sand Dunes National Park and
Preserve Act in 2000, it authorized “hunting, fishing, and
trapping” within the national preserve. 202 Similar provisions
apply in the Cape Cod National Seashore, the Delaware Gap
National Recreation Area, the Jean Lafitte National Historical
Park and Preserve, and numerous other units within the
national park system. 203
Other provisions are designed to preserve certain national
parks in their natural condition. The Everglades National Park
establishment statute directs that the park “be permanently
reserved as a wilderness, and no development of the project or
plan for the entertainment of visitors shall be undertaken
which will interfere with the preservation intact of the natural
197. CARR, supra note 83, at 26.
198. Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub L. No. 90-544, § 402(e), 82 Stat. 926, 929 (1968)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 90c-1(e) (2012)).
199. Act of Sept. 12, 1964, Pub L. No. 88-590, § 4(a), 78 Stat. 934, 938 (1964)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 271c(a) (2012)).
200. See EVERHART, supra note 43, at 82.
201. Voyageurs National Park Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 91-661, § 303, 84
Stat. 1972 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160h (2012)).
202. Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106–530, § 7(c)(1), 114 Stat. 2527, 2531 (2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh5(c)(1) (2012)).
203. See generally Fischman, supra note 43, at 804–05 (listing examples of
statutory provisions authorizing hunting).
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unique flora and fauna and the essential primitive conditions
now prevailing in the area.” 204 The statute expanding Acadia
National Park dictates a specific balance between conservation
and enjoyment. It first provides that the management and use
of the part of the national park situated on Isle au Haut “shall
not interfere with the maintenance of a viable local community
with a traditional resource based-economy outside the
boundary of the park.” 205 It continues, though, to require that
“every effort shall be exerted to maintain and preserve this
portion of the park in as nearly its present state and condition
as possible.” 206 Moreover, the statute restricts visitation in
order “to conserve the character of the town and to protect the
quality of the visitor experience.” 207
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA) is the statute that established more new national
parks than any other single law and that contains the most
specific management directions. 208 ANILCA created ten new
national parks units and expanded three others, established
nine wildlife refuges and expanded seven others, designated
twenty-six wild and scenic rivers, and produced various new
conservation areas and national monuments. 209 ANILCA’s
provisions expanding Denali National Park state that the NPS
shall manage the park to protect and interpret its scenic values
and wildlife habitat, and to provide wilderness recreational
opportunities. 210 ANILCA states similar management
204. Act of May 30, 1934, ch. 371, § 4, 48 Stat. 817, (1934) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 410c (2012)).
205. Act of Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-335, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1627, 1628 (1982).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2000). The enactment of ANILCA is described in
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS IN THE AMERICAN MIND 296–315 (4th ed. 2001),
and Congress Clears Alaska Lands Legislation, CONG. Q. ALMANAC,
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal80-1175027 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/P86E-JDTH. For the problems attendant with lameduck legislation generally, see John Copeland Nagle, Lame Duck Logic, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1177 (2012), and John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment
Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470 (1997).
209. See Congress Clears Alaska Lands Legislation, supra note 208.
210. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), Pub. L. No.
96-487, § 202(3)(a), 94 Stat. 2371, 2382–83 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410hh1(3)(a) (2012)) (providing that Denali National Park “shall be managed for the
following purposes, among others: To protect and interpret the entire mountain
massif, and additional scenic mountain peaks and formations; and to protect
habitat for, and populations of fish and wildlife including, but not limited to,
brown/grizzly bears, moose, caribou, Dall sheep, wolves, swans and other
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directives for Gates of the Arctic National Park and Katmai
National Park. 211 Congress also found that “there is a need for
access for surface transportation purposes across the Western
(Kobuk River) unit of the Gates of the Arctic National Preserve
(from the Ambler Mining District to the Alaska Pipeline Haul
Road),” so it directed the NPS to permit such access after the
preparation of “an environmental and economic analysis solely
for the purpose of determining the most desirable route for the
right-of-way and terms and conditions which may be required
for the issuance of that right-of-way.” 212 Another ANILCA
provision authorizes the NPS “to develop access to the Harding
Icefield and to allow use of mechanized equipment on the
icefield for recreation” in Kenai Fjords National Park.213
ANILCA also requires the NPS to “permit aircraft to continue
to land at sites in the Upper Charley River watershed”
“[e]xcept at such times when and locations where to do so
would be inconsistent with the purposes of the preserve.” 214
Two recent cases illustrate the controversies that arise
under the statutes establishing specific national parks. Both
cases involved park visitors who wanted to enjoy the current
environmental conditions while the NPS sought to restore
historic natural conditions. The first case involved the Indiana
Dunes National Lakeshore. 215 Congress established the
waterfowl; and to provide continued opportunities, including reasonable access,
for mountain climbing, mountaineering and other wilderness recreational
activities”).
211. See id. § 201(4)(a), 94 Stat. at 2378–79 (stating that the management of
Gates of the Arctic National Park must “maintain the wild and undeveloped
character of the area, including opportunities for visitors to experience solitude,
and the natural environmental integrity and scenic beauty of the mountains,
forelands, rivers, lakes, and other natural features; to provide continued
opportunities,
including
reasonable
access,
for
mountain
climbing,
mountaineering, and other wilderness recreational activities; and to protect
habitat for, and the populations, of fish and wildlife, including, but not limited to,
caribou, grizzly bears, Dall sheep, moose, wolves, and raptorial birds”); id. §
202(2), 94 Stat. at 2382 (providing that Katmai National Park must be managed
“for the following purposes, among others: To protect habitats for, and populations
of, fish and wildlife including, but not limited to, high concentrations of
brown/grizzly bears and their denning areas; to maintain unimpaired the water
habitat for significant salmon populations; and to protect scenic, geological,
cultural and recreational features”). See generally John Copeland Nagle, Enjoying
Katmai (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing the efforts to
facilitate increased visitor enjoyment of this remote national park).
212. ANILCA § 201(4)(b) & (d), 94 Stat. at 2379.
213. Id. § 201(5), 94 Stat. at 2380.
214. Id. § 201(10), 94 Stat. at 2382.
215. See Coal. to Protect Cowles Bog Area v. Salazar, No. 2:12-CV-515, 2013
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national lakeshore in 1966, a half-century after biologist Henry
Cowles conducted ecological research there. 216 The NPS
wanted to restore Cowles Bog to the wetland prairie condition
that existed when Dr. Cowles studied it at the beginning of the
twentieth century. 217 The neighbors of the lakeshore, though,
noted that the establishment legislation stated that the
national lakeshore was to be “permanently preserved in its
present state,” which would mean the forest that had grown
there by the time that Congress established the national
lakeshore in 1966. 218 But the court thought it would be
“absurd” to hold that Congress intended that language “to
mean that the park had to be maintained in something like a
hermetically sealed geodome from 1966 on.” 219 Instead, the
court found that the act establishing the national lakeshore
“grants the Secretary wide discretion to manage the Lakeshore
as he deems appropriate.” 220
The second case concerned the deer population in
Washington, D.C.’s Rock Creek Park. 221 The NPS sought to
reduce the number of deer by employing sharpshooters.222
Local users of the park complained that the NPS’s plan would
turn the park into “a killing field.” 223 They cited the park’s
enabling act, which required that the park be managed in its
“natural condition.” 224 Again, the court allowed the NPS to
pursue its vision of the natural conditions of the park. The
court relied on Chevron to find that the park’s enabling act
“does not speak directly to deer management,” and the NPS’s
“balanced approach” to deer management was permissible
under Chevron step two. 225

WL 3338491 (N.D. Ind. July 2, 2013).
216. See NAT’L PARK SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: RESTORATION OF
COWLES BOG WETLAND COMPLEX’S LAKE PLAIN WET LAKE PLAIN WET-MESIC
PRAIRIE 5–6 (2012).
217. See id.
218. Act of Nov. 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-761, § 7(b), 80 Stat. 1309, 1311
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460u-6 (2012)).
219. Coal. to Protect Cowles Bog Area, 2013 WL 3338491 at *7.
220. Id. at *8.
221. See Grunewald v. Jarvis, 930 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2013).
222. Id. at 80.
223. Id. at 76.
224. Id. at 77 (quoting Ch. 1001, § 7, 26 Stat. 492 (1890)).
225. Id. at 85 (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
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B. Funding Legislation
The statutes providing funds to the NPS also affect the
management of national parks. Complaints about the funding
for the national parks are as old as the national parks
themselves. 226 In 1916—the same year that Congress
established the NPS—Oregon Senator Henry Lane objected to
any appropriations for the newly-created Hawai’i National
Park because “it should not cost anything to maintain a
volcano.” 227 That attitude prompted Western author Bernard
DeVoto to write an article in 1953 entitled “Let’s Close the
National Parks,” arguing that “[t]he national park system must
be temporarily reduced to a size for which Congress is willing
to pay.” 228 But a higher amount of congressional appropriations
does not necessarily favor conservation. Rather, most funding
goes to building and maintaining facilities used by visitors to
the parks, and to paying employees who focus on facilitating
the enjoyment of the parks more than their conservation.
DeVoto, for example, insisted that the first fiscal priority was
to “provide proper facilities and equipment to take care of the
crowds,” and only then could we “save from destruction the
most majestic scenery in the United States, and the most
important field areas of archeology, history, and biological
science.” 229
More money can mean more enjoyment and less
conservation. From that perspective, the best thing that
Congress can do for conservation is to leave a national park
alone. One NPS director reportedly told the Sierra Club’s board
of directors that “[w]e have no money . . . . We can do no
226. See 1911 NATIONAL PARK CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 7 (statement of
Thomas Cooper, Assistant to the President, Northern Pacific Railway) (“Congress
has been parsimonious in its treatment of the national parks to a degree that
largely defeats the very purpose of their creation.”).
227. 53 Cong. Rec. 9253 (1916) (statement of Sen. Lane). Senator Shafroth
responded to Lane that some funding was necessary because “you have got to
have some supervision of the park.” Id. (statement of Sen. Shafroth).
228. BERNARD DEVOTO, LET’S CLOSE THE NATIONAL PARKS (1953), reprinted in
AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 188; see also NAT’L PARK
SERV. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, STATE OF THE PARKS: A REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS (1980) (“The staff and the funding resources currently available
within the research and the resource management areas clearly are inadequate to
respond to the needs of the Service.”), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK
SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 408.
229. BERNARD DEVOTO, LET’S CLOSE THE NATIONAL PARKS (1953), reprinted in
AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 188.
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harm.” 230 The National Parks Conservation Association
(NPCA) responded to the same impulse during the October
2013 federal government shutdown. 231 The lack of funding
meant that no one could visit the parks, so the NPCA felt
obliged to respond to the question “[w]ouldn’t it be good for
parks to have a break from visitation?” 232 The NPCA answered
that “[c]losing our parks is not only depriving visitors of an
experience of a lifetime, it is also preventing park staff from
monitoring and maintaining natural and historic resources
throughout the park system.” 233
C. Specific Responsive Provisions
Ordinarily, the Organic Act, the statute establishing a
national park, and the federal environmental statutes
discussed in Part II provide all of the law governing the NPS’s
management of a park. Those laws give the NPS significant
management discretion, so inevitably the NPS exercises its
discretion in a way that displeases some of those who are
interested in a park. When that happens, Congress has enacted
or proposed numerous statutes directing a particular resolution
of a specific national park management controversy. One
statutory provision permitted the continued operation of a
Kiwanis Club within Olympic National Park. 234 Congress has
also enacted numerous statutes governing scenic overflights at
the Grand Canyon National Park. 235 In another law, Congress
directed NPS to “immediately cease” a plan that resulted in a
settlement agreement to exterminate deer and elk on Santa
Rosa Island in Channel Islands National Park. 236 And
230. CARR, supra note 83, at 6 (quoting NPS Director Newton Drury).
231. See John Garder, How Is the Government Shutdown Affecting National
Parks?, PARK ADVOCATE (Sept. 25, 2013), http://parkadvocate.org/how-would-agovernment-shutdown-affect-national-parks, archived at http://perma.cc/4BXAXLBF.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Act of Nov. 13, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-154, 105 Stat. 990, 999 (1991).
235. See Wendell H. Ford Aviation and Investment Reform Act of the 21st
Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 804, 114 Stat. 61, 192 (2000) (addressing quiet
aircraft technology for the Grand Canyon); Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity,
Noise Improvement, and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102581, § 134, 106 Stat. 4872, 4887 (1992) (authorizing a study of air traffic over the
Grand Canyon).
236. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, §1077(c), 120 Stat. 2083, 2406 (2006).
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Congress has repeatedly intervened to dictate the permissible
snowmobile usage within Yellowstone National Park
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” 237 The newest
provision authorizes an Alaskan native tribe to harvest
glaucous-winged gull eggs in their traditional homeland of
Glacier Bay National Park. 238 Numerous such statutory
provisions have responded to judicial decisions contrary to the
desired congressional management policy, including cases
involving vehicle access across wilderness lands in the
Cumberland Island National Seashore, the construction of a
new bridge across the St. Croix National Scenic River, the
exclusion of a renovated fire tower in Olympic National Park,
the permissible cruise ship traffic in Glacier Bay National
Park, and the continued operation of an oyster farm in Point
Reyes National Seashore. 239
Congress also guides the management of national parks
without actually enacting legislation. Sometimes the mere
introduction of a bill to change an NPS policy prompts the NPS
to make the desired change itself. 240 Members of Congress
routinely criticize NPS management decisions at committee
hearings.
Three ongoing disputes illustrate the interplay between
specific legislative management provisions, unenacted
proposals, and informal congressional oversight. At Cape
Hatteras National Recreational Seashore, Yukon Charley
237. Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-54 § 126, 119 Stat. 499
(2005) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the National Park Service
final winter use rules published in Part VII of the Federal Register for November
10, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 65348 et seq., shall be in force and effect for the winter use
season of 2005-2006 that commences on or about December 15, 2005.”);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No 108-447 § 146, 118 Stat. 2809
(2004). Most recently, Congress again mandated that the 2004 Rule remain in
effect for the 2006-2007 winter use season. Continuing Appropriations-FY 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-383, § 135, 120 Stat. 2678, 2679 (2006); Revised Continuing
Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 110-5, § 20516, 121 Stat. 8, 27 (2007).
238. See Huna Tlingit Traditional Gull Egg Use Act, Pub. L. No. 113-142, 128
Stat. 1749 (2014).
239. See John Copeland Nagle, Wilderness Exceptions, 44 ENVTL. L. 373, 404–
08 (2014) (describing the Cumberland Island National Seashore, Point Reyes
National Seashore, and Olympic National Park disputes); John Copeland Nagle,
Site-Specific Laws, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2167 (2013) (describing the St. Croix
National Scenic River dispute).
240. See, e.g., NAGLE, supra note 19, at 119 (describing Senator Dorgan’s
successful efforts to persuade the NPS to allow private hunters to cull elk in
Theodore Roosevelt National Park).
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National Preserve, and Fort Vancouver National Historic Site,
Congress, the NPS, and interested parties are engaged in
ongoing efforts to dictate the balance between conservation and
enjoyment of each national park. The controversies at these
three parks show how existing law, NPS management
discretion, and the threat of new law operate together to guide
specific management decisions.
1.

Cape Hatteras National Recreational Seashore

The first dispute arises in Cape Hatteras, a barrier island
off the coast of North Carolina where Congress approved the
first national seashore in 1937. 241 The seashore’s enabling act
stated that
[e]xcept for certain portions of the area, deemed to be
especially adaptable for recreational uses, particularly
swimming, boating, sailing, fishing, and other recreational
activities of similar nature, which shall be developed for
such uses as needed, the said area shall be permanently
reserved as a primitive wilderness and no development of
the project or plan for the convenience of visitors shall be
undertaken which would be incompatible with the
preservation of the unique flora and fauna or the
physiographic conditions now prevailing in this area. 242

The newly authorized national seashore required further
federal legislation before it was even established. In 1940,
Congress changed the official name to the “Cape Hatteras
National Recreational Seashore” and it expressly authorized
hunting there. 243 The seashore became a reality in 1950. 244 The
241. See Act of Aug. 17, 1937, ch. 687, § 4, 50 Stat. 670 (1937).
242. Id. § 4.
243. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 459, § 1, 54 Stat. 702 (1940). The NPS reverted
to the original “national seashore” name to maintain consistency with the
additional national seashores that Congress created during the 1960s and 1970s,
and subsequent federal statutes have referred to the “national seashore,” too. See
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL CAPE HATTERAS NATIONAL
SEASHORE OFF-ROAD VEHICLE MANAGEMENT PLAN / ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 14 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS]. But Congress
never officially changed the name from “national recreational seashore,” as
recreation proponents continue to remind the NPS.
244. See generally CAMERON BINKLEY, THE CREATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF
CAPE HATTERAS NATIONAL SEASHORE: THE GREAT DEPRESSION THROUGH
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island remained unconnected from the mainland until the
construction of a bridge in 1963, which began a vast increase in
visitation to the national seashore. 245 The seashore now
attracts more than two million visitors annually. 246
Local residents and tourists have long relied on cars and
ORVs to access their preferred location within the national
seashore. 247 Such vehicles are especially important given the
scarcity of parking and pedestrian access to prime beach
locations. 248 But complaints about vehicles on the beach have
existed almost as long as there have been vehicles on the
beach. 249 These complaints initially targeted the interference
MISSION 66 97–100 (2007) (crediting a donation from Paul Mellon, the eldest son
of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, for allowing the NPS to acquire the
lands needed to establish the national seashore in 1950).
245. See 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS, supra note 243, at i (observing “[t]he
paving of NC-12, the completion of the Bonner Bridge connecting Bodie and
Hatteras islands in 1963, and the introduction of the State of North Carolina ferry
system to Ocracoke Island facilitated visitor access to the sound and ocean
beaches”).
246. NAT’L PARK SERV., ANNUAL PARK RANKING REPORT FOR RECREATION
VISITORS IN: 2012 (2012) (reporting that 2,302,040 people visited Cape Hatteras
National Seashore in 2012). See 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS, supra note 243, at 16
(reporting that “[s]eashore visitors participate in a variety of recreational
activities, including beach recreation (sunbathing, swimming, shell collecting,
etc.), fishing (surf and boat), hiking, hunting, motorized boating, nonmotorized
boating (sailing, kayaking, canoeing), nature study, photography, ORV use (beach
driving),
shellfishing,
sightseeing,
watersports
(surfing,
windsurfing,
kiteboarding, etc.), and wildlife viewing”).
247. 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS, supra note 243, at i (noting that “[h]istorically,
beach driving at the Seashore was for the purpose of transportation, and not
recreation”).
248. Id. at ii (explaining that “[v]isitors who come for some popular
recreational activities such as surf fishing and picnicking are accustomed to using
large amounts and types of recreational equipment that cannot practically be
hauled over these distances by most visitors without some form of motorized
access. For many visitors, the time needed and the physical challenge of hiking to
the distant sites, or for some even to close sites, can discourage or preclude access
by nonmotorized means.”).
249. See BINKLEY, supra note 244, at 161 (“During Mission 66, the impact of
driving on the beaches was a major concern. Superintendent Hanks declared that
‘driving along the ocean shore by the public must be controlled’ to reduce its
impact on the recreational purposes the park was established to meet, specifically
picnicking, swimming, and surf-casting, all of which ‘require assurance of nonintervention by shore driving.’”); id. at 180 (“Automobile driving on the beach is
an infrequent topic in NPS and congressional correspondence from this period,
but clearly the National Park Service saw vehicular access to the beach as being
necessary to fulfill an obligation to allow continued commercial fishing by legal
residents of the city.”); id. at 194 (“The first concerned the presence of off-road
vehicles or ‘beach buggies,’ especially at Cape Point near the famous Cape
Hatteras Lighthouse. Such vehicles, then mainly used by fishermen, concentrated
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with other recreational activities, but more recently the
wellbeing of the seashore’s wildlife has become a greater
concern. A variety of birds, turtles, and plants—including
several endangered species—use the same beach that many
recreational visitors favor. 250
The conflict between the vehicles and wildlife sharing the
Cape Hatteras beach yielded a 2005 lawsuit alleging that the
NPS was violating the ESA by failing to regulate vehicles on
the beach. 251 The NPS responded in 2007 by developing an
Interim Protected Species Management Strategy, but that
interim strategy provoked another lawsuit alleging violations
of the ESA, the Organic Act, and an executive order governing
ORVs within national parks. 252 In 2008, the plaintiff
environmental groups, the intervener local governments, ORV
users, fishing interests, and the NPS agreed to a consent
decree which obligated the NPS to complete an ORV
management plan and an accompanying environmental impact
statement for the seashore by the end of 2010. 253
The NPS issued the required EIS in December 2010,
evaluating six alternative management approaches ranging
from retention of the 2005 interim strategy, continuation of the
terms of the 2008 consent decree, and other combinations of
regulating beach access and protecting birds. 254 The NPS
near the best fishing sites in groups of up to fifty or so, leaving piles of beach trash
and making it difficult for other visitors to enjoy the scenic vista. The problem
may have existed for awhile, but by 1972, as one writer informed Director George
B. Hartzog, Jr., a person ‘literally could not take a photograph of the waves by
themselves without two or three hip-booted intruders in the viewfinder.’ This
visitor did not want a total ban on the buggies but did want some restrictions. He
protested that the NPS mission was to leave the land ‘unimpaired’ and noted that
if there were fifty buggies this year, when would it stop? ‘You might as well call it
the Hatteras Parking Lot,’ he concluded.”).
250. See 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS, supra note 243, at ii (observing that “the
Seashore provides a variety of important habitats created by its dynamic
environmental processes, including habitats for the federally listed piping plover;
sea turtles; and one listed plant species, the seabeach amaranth. The Seashore
contains ecologically important habitats such as marshes, tidal flats, and riparian
areas, and hosts various species of concern such as colonial waterbirds (least
terns, common terns, and black skimmers), American oystercatcher, and Wilson’s
plover, all of which are listed by the North Carolina Wildlife Resources
Commission (NCWRC) as species of special concern. In addition, the gull-billed
tern, also found at the Seashore, is listed by the NCWRC as threatened.”).
251. See id. at 26.
252. See id.
253. See S. REP. NO. 113-102, at 2–3 (2013) (summarizing the litigation).
254. See 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS, supra note 243, at 11.
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adopted its preferred alternative in order to “provide a
reasonably balanced approach to designating ORV routes and
vehicle-free areas and providing for the protection of park
resources.” 255

Cars on the beach at Cape Hatteras National Seashore,
Memorial Day weekend, 2007 256
That plan provoked outrage among the residents of Cape
Hatteras who were accustomed to unregulated use of the beach
and to serving tourists who came for such use themselves. The
Coalition for Beach Access—a group of recreational interests
and local governments—insisted that “[i]t is imperative that
ORV use be recognized for exactly what it is: A historical
means of access to an area especially attractive for recreational
opportunities.” 257 The Coalition further complained that
Without sensible beach access, there is no reason for
tourists to come here. Since 2008, successful businesses that
are older than the park itself have started to fail. All walks
of business are reporting that staffs have been reduced by
25 to 50% and the same for their sales figures. 258

It also insisted that “[w]hen conflicts between ‘conserving
resources and values and providing for enjoyment of them’
arise, NPS is obligated to vigorously search for solutions, not to
defer to potentially more easily implemented conservation
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
COAL. FOR BEACH ACCESS, CAPE HATTERAS NATIONAL SEASHORE
RECREATIONAL AREA, ORV ACCESS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT POSITION
STATEMENT 6 (2010).
258. Id. at 17.
255.
256.
257.
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measures.” 259 The NPS had considered numerous alternative
solutions—including escorting vehicles around nesting birds,
moving chicks to a nearby national wildlife refuge, and fencing
chicks away from an ORV corridor—but it declined to fully
evaluate them in the EIS because they were judged to be
impractical or ineffective. 260
Local residents unsuccessfully challenged the NPS plan in
federal court. 261 The court first rejected the claim that the plan
violated the act establishing the national seashore. “ORV use is
not a recreational activity explicitly mentioned in the
Seashore’s Enabling Act,” explained the court, “and the final
rule exhibits that the NPS did extensively consider ORV use on
the Seashore.” 262 The court added that “the Seashore’s
Enabling Act and the Organic Act are not in conflict on this
issue,” though it also asserted that “over twenty years of
federal court decisions confirm[] that conservation is the
predominant facet of the Organic Act”—a claim that I refute
above. 263 The court next rejected the NEPA claim because the
NPS properly considered alternative plans and the
socioeconomic impacts of the plan, and the plaintiffs failed to
raise their objections to the cultural impacts of the plan until
they went to court. 264 “At bottom,” the court concluded, the
plaintiffs wanted the court “to flyspeck NPS’s environmental
analysis in order to identify any minor deficiency to propound
as a basis to reject the final rule, which the Court will not and
cannot do.” 265
North Carolina’s congressional delegation moved quickly to
scuttle the NPS plan. The delegation’s plan drew bipartisan
support from North Carolina’s senators—Democratic Senator
Kay Hagan and Republican Senator Richard Burr—and from
Walter Jones, who represents Cape Hatteras in the House. 266
Their proposed bill would reinstate the interim strategy
adopted by the NPS in 2005. 267 Both the Senate and the House
259. Id. at 20.
260. See 2010 CAPE HATTERAS EIS, supra note 243, at 89–95.
261. See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. Jewell, No. 2:13-CV-1-BO,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84596 (E.D.N.C. June 19, 2014).
262. Id. at *16.
263. Id. (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp.
2d 1178, 1191 (D. Utah 2005)).
264. Id. at *24–30, *36–37.
265. Id. at *37.
266. See H.R. 4094, 112th Cong. (2012).
267. See id.
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have held multiple hearings on the controversy. 268 An NPS
official voiced the agency’s “strong opposition” to the bill
because
the final ORV Management Plan / Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) and special regulation are accomplishing
these objectives far better than the defunct Interim
Strategy. . . . The great majority of the beach is open to
ORVs, visitation is rising, and tourist revenues are at record
levels. At the same time, beach-nesting birds and sea turtles
are finally showing much-needed improvements. 269

The environmental organizations that initiated the litigation
agreed with the NPS. 270 But Representative Jones asserted
that “[t]his bill is about jobs, it’s about taxpayers’ right to
access the recreational areas they own, and it’s about restoring
balance and common sense to Park Service management.”271
Joe Manchin, the Democratic Senator from West Virginia who
cosponsored the bill, agreed that the NPS plan failed to strike
the right balance because “[i]t’s actually hurting the local
economy and affecting the experience of vacationers.” Manchin
added that “in this instance the Park Service is acting as an
adversary and not an ally. I’ve always said government should
be your partner and your ally, trying to find the balance
between the economy and the environment.” 272 And Wyoming
Senator John Barasso was impressed by the “example of an
entire delegation, elected by the people who live and work and
recreate in an area supporting the same legislation,”

268. See National Parks Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks of
the S. Energy & Natural Res. Comm., 113th Cong. 1 (2013) [hereinafter National
Parks Bills Hearing]; H.R. 4094, ‘‘Preserving Access to Cape Hatteras National
Seashore Recreational Area Act’’; and Oversight Hearing on ‘‘Access Denied:
Turning Away Visitors to National Parks”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l
Parks, Forests & Pub. Lands of the H. Natural Res. Comm., 112th Cong. 4 (2012)
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4094].
269. National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 268, at 17 (statement of Peggy
O’Dell, NPS Deputy Director for Operations).
270. Id. at 46 (statement of Derb. S. Carter, Jr., Director of the North Carolina
Offices of the Southern Environmental Law Center) (contending that the NPS
“weighed all the comments and public input and struck a careful and fair balance
among competing uses of the Seashore”).
271. Hearing on H.R. 4094, supra note 268, at 4 (statement of Rep. Jones).
272. National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 268, at 23 (statement of Sen.
Manchin).
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supporting the bill on a bipartisan basis. 273
The House approved the proposed legislation in 2012, but
the Senate failed to act on it. 274 Then, in September 2013, the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee approved a
substitute bill without dissent. 275 Rather than simply tossing
the 2010 NPS plan and reinstating the 2005 interim strategy,
the committee’s bill directed the NPS to “designate pedestrian
and vehicle corridors around areas of the National Seashore
closed because of wildlife buffers”; to “ensure that the buffers
are of the shortest duration and cover the smallest area
necessary to protect a species”; to engage in a public process to
consider reducing some of the vehicle closures; and to
“construct new vehicle access points and roads . . . as
expeditiously as practicable.” 276 But instead of acting on that
bill, the House again approved the reinstatement of the interim
management plan as part of a controversial package of public
lands measures that the Senate declined to consider. 277
Another year passed, and then Congress added a provision to
the military funding bill, passed in December 2014, to address
the Cape Hatteras dispute. The legislative fix directs the
Secretary of the Interior to “review and modify wildlife buffers”
by imposing the minimum buffer necessary and by allowing
pedestrian and vehicle access to unaffected areas. 278 The
Secretary must also build new roads and vehicle access points
and consider additional beach openings. 279 Congress thus
maintained the core of the NPS’s plan while instructing the
agency to consider additional steps to provide access to the
national seashore.

273. Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Barasso). Senator Barasso added that “[e]very
effort, I believe, should be made by the Administration and Members of Congress
to support the desires of the local people, the delegation”.
274. See Jessica Estepa, House Clears Controversial Package On Party Lines,
E&E NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2014/02/06/
stories/1059994181, archived at http://perma.cc/LWM9-6B7G.
275. See S. REP. NO. 113-102, at 1–2 (2013).
276. Id.
277. See Public Access and Lands Improvement Act, H.R. 2954, 113th Cong., §§
501–04 (2014) (title containing the “Preserving Access to Cape Hatteras National
Seashore Recreational Area Act”).
278. See Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. 3979, § 3057(b)(2) (2014).
279. Id. § 3057(c).
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Yukon Charley National Preserve

The second dispute began when a seventy-year-old boater
refused to allow NPS personnel to conduct a boat inspection
while he was traveling along the Yukon River in the Yukon
Charley National Preserve in Alaska. 280 The incident raised a
latent legal question under ANILCA of whether the NPS or the
state had jurisdiction over certain Alaskan rivers. Alaska’s
Representative Don Young engaged NPS director Jonathan
Jarvis in a colloquy about the dispute during a 2011 hearing on
the mission of the NPS. 281 Young began by reminding Jarvis
about their discussion “in my office about the incident on the
river” and how Jarvis had “made a pledge to work with me to
correct the behavior of the law enforcement rangers in the
management of the Yukon Charley Preserve.” 282 Jarvis replied
that “we have intervened pretty aggressively in Alaska . . . to
have a great discussion around your concerns and the concerns
of the local communities.” 283 Young interrupted Jarvis, saying
“I haven’t got all day,” and proceeded to attack the “real snotty
attitude” of the NPS regional director in Alaska. 284 Young
concluded his second round of questioning at the hearing by
telling Jarvis that “I am going to hound you until something is
done up there.” 285
280. See Tim Mowry, Lawyer in River Arrest by Park Service Files Federal
Appeal, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.adn.com/article/
20120411/lawyer-river-arrest-park-service-files-federal-appeal,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/HW56-EYF5 (reporting that “[a] federal judge in October found
Wilde guilty of three misdemeanor charges stemming from a September 2010 runin with park rangers in the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve east of
Fairbanks. Wilde cursed out two rangers when they tried to stop him for a boat
safety inspection on the Yukon River and continued upriver. The rangers pursued
him, with one of them drawing a pistol and then a shotgun. Wilde pulled over to
the riverbank, where a brief scuffle ensued and the rangers wrestled Wilde to the
ground and arrested him. He spent four days in jail.”).
281. See Spending, Priorities and Missions of the National Service and the
President’s FY 2012 Budget Proposal Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Nat’l Parks, Forests and Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 112th
Cong. 22 (2011).
282. Id. (statement of Rep. Young).
283. Id. (statement of NPS Director Jarvis).
284. Id. (statement of Rep. Young).
285. Id. Representative Rivera questioned Jarvis why more lands in Big
Cypress couldn’t be designated as backcountry recreation instead of as wilderness.
Jarvis responded that “Big Cypress is a complicated, and often controversial,
place,” and he then described the “arduous public process that took almost 10
years to get to a point where there is an appropriate balance.” Id. at 27. But
Rivera was unconvinced, and he “strongly urge[d] the service to reconsider the
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True to his word, Representative Young attached a rider to
the Department of the Interior’s funding bill that would
preclude the NPS from using any of its appropriations “to
implement or enforce regulations concerning boating and other
activities on or relating to waters located within YukonCharley National Preserve.” 286 Representative Norman Dicks
introduced an amendment that would have stripped Young’s
rider from the bill, thus provoking an extended discussion of
the issue on the floor of the House. 287 Dicks insisted that
Young “has already won the case. The people there, the two
rangers, have been reassigned to another duty . . . .”288
Representative Moran worried that the rider “creates a
precedent. Any time something happens on a national preserve
or park land, they could come to the Congress and say, all
right, no more inspections, and we could get a proliferation of
these kinds of things specific to individual national reserves or
parks.” 289 To which Representative Simpson replied, “Exactly.
If we can’t have oversight about what goes on and about what
the Park Service does, why are we even here?”290
Representative Young upped the ante by proclaiming that
“[t]he Park Service is for the people; it’s not for the Park
Service. The Park Service in Alaska has become, very frankly,
I’d say, like an occupying army of a free territory.” 291 The
House agreed with Representative Young and voted against
Representative Dicks’ proposed amendment 237 to 174. 292 The
provision survived the Senate, and was part of the government
funding law that President Obama signed in December 2011. 293
designation” of wilderness. Id. (statement of Rep. Rivera). The management of Big
Cypress was also the subject of a congressional field hearing in Florida. See
National Parks of Florida: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 1
(2006) [hereinafter Florida National Parks Hearing].
286. 157 CONG. REC. H5605 (daily ed. July 7, 2012).
287. See id. at H5605–08.
288. Id. (statement of Rep. Dicks). See also id. at H5605 (statement of Rep.
Moran) (noting that “normally we don’t change national policy to deal with
misconduct, if that’s what it was, on the part of certain individuals”).
289. Id. (statement of Rep. Moran).
290. Id. at H5608 (statement of Rep. Simpson).
291. Id. (statement of Rep. Young). See also id. at H5606 (statement of Rep.
Young) (“Think about the little people. Quit thinking about these agencies. These
agencies aren’t God.”).
292. See id. at H5629.
293. See Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 119, 125
Stat. 786 (2011).
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Fort Vancouver National Historic Site

The third dispute involves Fort Vancouver National
Historic Site, whose namesake is a replica of the stockade built
by the Hudson Bay Company in 1829 along the northern bank
of the Columbia River in what is now Vancouver,
Washington. 294 In addition to a replica of the nineteenth
century trading post, the historic site includes the Pearson Air
Museum, which features historic airplanes presumably
unimaginable to the traders of the Hudson Bay Company. 295 A
municipal airport had grown up near the fort before it was
protected, so in 1972 the City of Vancouver sold seventy-two
acres of airport property to the NPS “to allow the City to move
active airport operations further away from the NPS’s
reconstruction of historic Fort Vancouver.” 296 The agreement
also allowed the city “to build the air museum on a small parcel
of the NPS’s larger historic site that was adjacent to the cityowned, and also historic, Pearson Airfield.” 297 Soon “the
museum was filled with privately-owned planes that
highlighted the rich history of aviation in Southwest
Washington.” 298
The combination of a historic nineteenth century trading
post and an air museum, along with the cooperative
management agreement between the NPS and the city,
collapsed in 2012 due to disagreement about the permissible
use of the museum. The NPS denied permits for benefit
294. See NAT’L PARK SERV., FORT VANCOUVER NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE
GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN 2003 & MCLOUGHLIN HOUSE UNIT MANAGEMENT
PLAN 2007 1 (2008) (noting that Congress acted in 1948 “to preserve as a national
monument the site of the original Hudson’s Bay stockade (of Fort Vancouver) and
sufficient surrounding land to preserve the historical features of the area” for “the
benefit of the people of the United States” (citing 62 Stat. 532 and the Senate
Report on the legislation)).
295. See Pearson Air Museum, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/
fova/planyourvisit/pearsonairmuseum.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/RJQ7-YBHK.
296. See H.R. 588, Vietnam Veterans Donor Acknowledgment Act of 2013; H.R.
716, to Direct DOI to Convey Certain Federal Land to the City of Vancouver,
Washington; and H.R. 819, Preserving Access to Cape Hatteras National Seashore
Recreational Area Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands and Envt’l
Regulation of the H. Natural Res. Comm., 113th Cong. 26 (2013) [hereinafter Fort
Vancouver Hearing] (testimony of Elson Strahan, President & CEO, Fort
Vancouver National Trust).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Beutler).
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concerts for the USO and for a veteran’s group, a picnic for area
churches, and a youth soccer fair because such large, noisy
events violated “federal law and policy.” 299 The conflict
escalated to the point where the NPS demanded the keys to the
museum from the trust that ran it for the city, and the city
responded by removing all of the historic aircraft from the
museum. 300
Jaime Herrera Beutler, the local member of Congress,
“organized and attended countless meetings with staff from
every level of the Park Service, from Director Jon Jarvis to the
local level” in an effort to resolve the dispute. 301 Similarly, the
director of the trust that had managed the museum met with
the NPS regional director, who reportedly said that “NPS
regulations are the same for all NPS parks and that our site is
no different than Yellowstone in this respect.”302
Representative Beutler then introduced legislation that would
transfer the museum out of the NPS and back into city
ownership. 303 She soon noted that her “office has been flooded
with pleas by my constituents to pass this legislation.” 304 The
Public Lands and Environmental Regulation subcommittee of
the House Resources Committee held a hearing on that bill and
the overall controversy in March 2013. 305 The NPS voiced its
“strong opposition” to the bill because
[r]emoval of this land from the management of the National
Park Service would diminish the level of protection afforded
to this area and would diminish the integrity of resources,
including the reconstructed fur trade post, within the rest of
299. Id. at 3, 38 (testimony of Dr. Herbert C. Frost, NPS Associate Director,
Natural Resource Stewardship and Science Frost).
300. See id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Beutler) (noting that the NPS “demand[ed]
the immediate handover of the museum’s alarm code and keys”).
301. Id. (statement of Rep. Beutler). See also Press Release, U.S.
Congresswoman Jamie Herrera Beutler, Jaime Herrera Beutler Tells Nat’l Park
Service to Preserve Local Cmty. Access to Fort Vancouver (June 20, 2012),
available at http://herrerabeutler.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Document
ID=300259, archived at http://perma.cc/6FM9-FDRJ (advising that “[i]f
compromise fails, the Park Service needs to know that a legislative fix is moving
forward”).
302. Fort Vancouver Hearing, supra note 296, at 27 (testimony of Elson
Strahan).
303. See 159 CONG. REC. H546 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2013) (statement of Rep.
Beutler).
304. Fort Vancouver Hearing, supra note 296, at 4 (statement of Rep. Beutler).
305. See id.
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the National Historic Site that are essential to the enabling
legislation of the park. 306

By contrast, the director of the trust that had managed the
museum testified that “since the community built and funded
the museum, the doors should be open to everyone for special
community events—for example, benefit concerts for the
military, church picnics, weddings and proms.” 307 He also
rebutted the NPS’s concern about maintaining the tranquility
of the site by observing that it is located within the middle of
the city, bordered by a freeway and a rail line, and on the flight
path for Portland International Airport. 308
D. The Case for Congressional Decisions Respecting
National Park Management
Congressional intervention in national park management
decisions is controversial. For some, it evidences the
exaggerated role of wealthy special interests. For others, it
306. Id. at 12 (testimony of Dr. Herbert C. Frost, NPS Associate Director,
Natural Resource Stewardship and Science) (noting that “[r]emoving this property
from federal ownership would also remove federal protections under cultural
resources preservation laws such as the National Historic Preservation Act, the
Archeological Resources Protection Act, the Native American Graves Repatriation
Act, and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act”).
307. Id. at 24 (testimony of Elson Strahan, President & CEO, Fort Vancouver
National Trust) (noting that “[s]ince the museum opened its doors in 1995, it has
operated using a sustainability model with the purpose of independently
supporting operations and educational programs without federal funds”); id. at 26
(estimating “the total community investments in the Pearson Air Museum to be
well over $8 million, inclusive of initial capital contributions and operational
support since the museum complex was developed. Over these past eighteen
years, the NPS has contributed negligible capital and operational support to the
museum.”). But see Park Assumes Direct Operational Responsibility for Pearson
Air Museum—Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps
.gov/fova/parkmgmt/pamops2013.htm (last updated Feb. 13, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/559V-7N3A (explaining that “[s]ince 1998, the National Park
Service has provided more than $1,300,000 in funding support to the Museum and
its immediate environs”).
308. Fort Vancouver Hearing, supra note 296, at 27 (testimony of Elson
Strahan). See also id. at 3 (testimony of Rep. Beutler) (describing the site as
“[b]ordered by freeways, an airport, and a busy rail line”). The supporters of
Representative Beutler’s bill have also questioned the inconsistency with which
the NPS applies its standards for permissible events. See id. (testimony of Rep.
Beutler) (noting that the NPS sponsored its own “Get Outdoors Event” with
activities “that are nearly identical to the activities” proposed in the denied permit
applications).
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displaces the professional judgment of the NPS with the
political whims of members of Congress. Another concern,
voiced by Rob Fischman, is that separate rules for different
national parks contradict the idea of a national park system. 309
These
concerns
are
misplaced
or
exaggerated.
Controversies regarding the conservation and enjoyment of
national parks often feature parties with roughly equal
political power. Indeed, contrary to the popular perception of
large corporations turning to Congress to secure special
benefits, it is common for those seeking to enjoy the parks to
complain that they possess less political power than their
conservationist opponents. At Cape Hatteras, for example, the
residents of small local communities that oppose the NPS
policy frequently complain that they are at the mercy of the
outsized power of national environmental groups. 310 Nor are
the aggrieved parties at Fort Vancouver wealthy special
interests. 311 A surprising number of national park enjoymentversus-conservation controversies feature similar political
dynamics. 312 Indeed, sometimes environmental advocates
beseech Congress to engage in additional oversight needed to
protect national parks “for future generations.” 313
309. See Fischman, supra note 43, at 808.
310. See Hearing on H.R. 4094, supra note 268, at 17 (statement of Warren
Judge, Chairman, Dare County Board of Commissioners) (describing those
affected by the environmental restrictions as “hundreds of grassroots
entrepreneurs who operate restaurants, gift shops, motels, cottages, fishing tackle
stores, and all the mom-and-pop businesses that provide the necessary
infrastructure to support our visitors”).
311. See Fort Vancouver Hearing, supra note 296 (reporting that the parties
opposed to the NPS management of Fort Vancouver National Historic Site
included the USO, a veteran’s group, area churches, and a youth soccer league).
312. See KEITER, supra note 125, at 266–67 (observing that “[w]hen political
realities have intervened and constrained the Park Service’s ability to resolve
thorny resource management issues, Congress has occasionally weighed in with
targeted amendments to address the problem, as seen in the case of the Redwood
Amendment, concessions reform, air tour overflights, the new science mandate,
and Elwha River restoration. The net result has not always been as sensitive to
nature conservation priorities as it might have been, but no law can provide
ironclad protection against politically powerful competing demands.”); FORESTA,
supra note 7, at 77 (reporting that during the 1970s “environmental organizations
were often on an equal or even firmer moral footing than the Park Service when
they went to Congress with their wishes for the National Park Service” because of
“the widespread view” that the NPS “was an overly aggressive, empire-building
agency”).
313. Florida National Parks Hearing, supra note 285, at 40 (statement of
Nathaniel Reed, Member of National Council, National Parks Conservation
Association).
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Concerns that congressional lawmaking undercuts the
authority of the NPS are misplaced. 314 Congress overturns a
tiny fraction of the management decisions made by the NPS.
When it does so, Congress typically acts because it balances the
values of conservation and enjoyment differently than the NPS
in a particular case, not because Congress disagrees with the
professional scientific judgment of the NPS. Similarly, the fact
that Congress reverses judicial interpretations of federal
statutes does not impugn the integrity of the federal courts. It
simply means that Congress has the last say about the
meaning of the statute, just as Congress gets to decide the
proper content of the statutes that it enacts.
Moreover, the existence of a national park system should
not preclude special rules for special places. It would be odd if
the NPS were forced to manage the spectacular scenery of
Grand Teton National Park in the same way that it manages
the historic features of Abraham Lincoln Birthplace National
Historical Park. Every unit of the national park system is
governed by the Organic Act, but the NPS manages those units
to achieve the specific purposes for which they were created.
That Congress occasionally acts to adopt a new management
policy shows the system’s flexibility, which has long been one of
its hallmarks.
The point is not that Congress always gets the answer
right. Sometimes it does; sometimes it doesn’t. But the same is
true of the NPS. If I were somehow vested with the authority to
resolve those three disputes, I would side with the NPS in the
Cape Hatteras dispute because I believe that it strikes the
right balance between wildlife preservation and visitor use, but
I would agree with Representative Beutler about Fort
Vancouver because the historic trading post and the airplane
museum seem mismatched in a way that is destined to produce
314. This argument was advanced, for example, by the National Parks
Conservation Association in response to the proposed legislation to divest the NPS
of the airplane museum at the Fort Vancouver National Historic Site. See
OutThere, Comment to Fort Vancouver National Historic Site, NAT’L PARKS
CONSERVATION
ASS’N,
http://www.npca.org/parks/fort-vancouver-nationalhistoric.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9S7F-B2M7
(accusing Representative Beutler of “legal bullying,” asserting that “[c]arving up
any national park to satisfy the wants of any event or group sets dangerous
precident [sic] and should not be permitted and certainly not legislated!”); see id.
(quoting NPCA Northwest program manager David Graves as saying “[i]t is not
appropriate for Congress to step in and take away part of a park to punish them
for a decision they made that is their prerogative”).
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future conflicts. I am not sure of the best policy for the Yukon
River, but I would expect that Congress is better positioned
than the NPS to resolve such fundamental federal-state
jurisdictional disputes. But I am not vested with that decisionmaking authority, nor should I be. Congress entrusted such
decisions to the NPS in the Organic Act, subject to the
environmental constraints imposed by other federal laws, while
reserving the right to overrule the NPS when the daunting
constitutional requirements for federal lawmaking are
satisfied.
CONCLUSION
The national parks are “America’s best idea.” 315 The
October 2013 federal government shutdown provides the most
recent evidence of the unparalleled popularity of the national
parks, for it was the fact that the national parks were closed to
visitors that came to symbolize the government’s closure. 316 It
is understandable, then, that the public remains more
interested in national park management than it is in many
other seemingly more pressing questions of public policy. This
combination of popular interest and NPS professional expertise
manifests itself in the tripartite structure of national park law.
The Organic Act gives the NPS broad discretion to make most
management decisions as it deems best, federal environmental
315. E.g., DUNCAN & BURNS, supra note 29; Wallace Stegner: A Word for
Wilderness, WILDERNESS.NET, http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/Stegner (last
visited Nov. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CG4P-NQS3. The frequent
reference to national parks as America’s best idea has prompted a variety of other
nominations. See, e.g., National Parks in the Pacific Northwest: Hearing Before
The Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Res. of the H. Comm.
on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Rep. Baird) (“[T]here’s jazz
and baseball and lots of other stuff, but the Bill of Rights and the National Parks
are profoundly important to me and to all of us . . . .”); THE NATIONAL PARKS:
AMERICA’S BEST IDEA (Florentine Films and WETA Washington D.C., Sept. 27,
2009) (statement of Clay Jenkinson that “the best idea” is that “all human beings,
irrespective of the accident of their birth, are entitled to enjoy the aspirations of
being fully complete and free human beings”). See also Joseph Sax, Helpless
Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV.
239, 240 (1976) (describing the national parks as “among the few unambiguous
triumphs of American public policy”).
316. See generally Garance Franke-Ruta, How the National Parks Became the
Biggest Battleground in the Shutdown, ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2013, 3:16 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/how-the-national-parksbecame-the-biggest-battleground-in-the-shutdown/280439, archived at http://
perma.cc/7PJ8-RJYW.
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statutes ensure that the most important environmental values
are respected within national parks, and occasionally Congress
intervenes to dictate a specific management outcome. This
system has evolved from the establishment of Yellowstone
National Park in 1872 to the adoption of the Organic Act in
1916 to the enactment of numerous federal environmental
statutes in the 1970s, with Congress all the while legislating
and overseeing specific park decisions. It has proved to be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate shifting understandings of
the national park while also being sufficiently definite to
prevent some of the more outrageous ideas for enjoying or
conserving the parks. The law governing the national parks, in
short, has played an important if overlooked role in securing
the place of national parks in the American consciousness
today.

